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APPRENDI’S DOMAIN 
 
JONATHAN F. MITCHELL  
 
 
 Recent Supreme Court decisions have extended the Sixth Amendment right of 
jury trial to some, but not all, disputed factual questions at sentencing. Apprendi v New 
Jersey,1 for example, held that the jury right attaches to any sentencing factor (other than 
recidivism) that increases the maximum allowable punishment for a crime. That means 
that if the law normally provides a ten-year maximum sentence for a firearms offense, but 
a “sentencing factor” raises that ceiling to thirty years in cases where the defendant used 
the firearm to commit murder, a jury must resolve that sentencing enhancement. At the 
same time, the Court has refused to extend the jury right to “mitigating” sentencing 
factors.2 So if the law provides a thirty-year maximum sentence for the aforementioned 
firearms offense, which drops to ten years if the defendant shows that he did not use the 
firearm to commit murder, the jury need not resolve that factual issue. And the Court has 
similarly refused to extend the jury right to facts that mandate minimum sentences 
without increasing the maximum allowable punishment.3  
 
**298 These court decisions fail to provide a coherent or sensible rule for 
distributing power between judge and jury. This is because the Supreme Court has 
inexplicably decided that all facts subject to the Sixth Amendment jury requirement must 
also be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and charged in indictments in federal 
prosecutions, as if they were “elements” of substantive crimes. Because previous cases 
had limited the Court’s proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement to the “elements” 
of substantive offenses, this has produced a jurisprudence in which the jury right, like the 
reasonable-doubt rule, attaches only to “elements” of crimes or their “functional 
equivalents.” So when Apprendi extended the jury right to sentencing facts that increase a 
defendant’s maximum allowable punishment, the Court simultaneously held that such 
facts were “functional equivalent[s] of [ ] element[s],”4 which prosecutors must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt. And when the Court refused to extend the jury right to other 
                                                 
Jonathan F. Mitchell is Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School.  
AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to Josh Bowers, Richard Epstein, Toby Heytens, Orin Kerr, Alison LaCroix, 
Jessica Lowe, Tom Miles, Trevor Morrison, Adam Mortara, Eric Posner, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, 
Jacqueline Ross, David Strauss, and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and to Nathan 
Cardon for outstanding research assistance. I wrote portions of this article while I was a visiting researcher 
at Georgetown University Law Center, and I am grateful to Associate Dean Lawrence Gostin and the Law 
Center for accommodating me during that time. Errors are mine alone.  
1 530 US 466 (2000).  
2 Id at 490 n 16.  
3 See Harris v United States, 536 US 545 (2002).  
4 Apprendi, 530 US at 494 n 19; see also id at 483 n 10 (“Put simply, facts that expose a defendant to a 
punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by definition ‘elements’ of a separate legal 
offense.”).  
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sentencing facts, it based those decisions on its view that such facts are not “elements” of 
crimes subject to the Court’s proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement.5 
 
This tie-in arrangement between the jury right and the proof-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt requirement is mistaken. The right of jury trial should extend well 
beyond the “elements” of crimes (and their “functional equivalents”) and should 
encompass all disputed questions of fact that purport to aggravate or mitigate a 
defendant’s guilt or punishment. But the courts should not necessarily require that these 
jury facts be charged by prosecutors or proved beyond a reasonable doubt as if they were 
“elements” of substantive crimes. Indeed, Apprendi’s historical claim that sentencing 
enhancements were treated as “elements” of offenses whenever they increased a 
defendant’s maximum punishment is demonstrably mistaken. And the platitudes from 
Joel Prentiss Bishop’s nineteenth-century treatises,6 which the pro-Apprendi Justices 
repeatedly invoke to support **299 this assertion,7 are patently false and did not 
accurately describe the law in actual court decisions of that era.8 Nineteenth-century 
courts repeatedly held that first-degree murder did not need to be charged in indictments 
as an “element” of a substantive crime, even though it increased a defendant’s maximum 
allowable punishment from life imprisonment to death, and even though it was decided 
by juries. These court decisions instead regarded first and second-degree murder as mere 
grades of punishment within the unitary offense of murder, and enforced a jury right that 
extended well beyond the facts that prosecutors were required to charge and prove as 
components of a substantive crime. The Court should therefore reaffirm and expand 
Apprendi’s Sixth Amendment holding, and overrule its reasonable-doubt holding and its 
corresponding implication that all “jury facts” must be treated as “elements” of 
substantive crimes. 
 
I. 
 
 The federal Constitution granted judges significant powers, including life tenure 
and salary protection, but did so with the understanding that a strong jury right would 
limit judicial power. To that end, the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”9 But 
once the Supreme Court in Apprendi resolved to extend this jury right to certain factual 
disputes at sentencing, it became hard to justify a regime that limits the jury right to a 
                                                 
5 See Harris, 536 US at 549 (plurality opinion) (holding that sentencing factors that establish 
mandatory minimums “are not elements, and are thus not subject to the Constitution’s . . . jury . . . 
requirements”) (emphasis added); McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79, 93 (1986) (refusing to extend the 
right of jury trial to a “sentencing consideration” because it is “not an element of any offense”). 
6 See, e.g., Joel Prentiss Bishop, 1 Criminal Procedure § 81 at 51 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1872) (cited 
hereinafter as “Bishop”) (stating that nineteenth-century indictments were required to include “every fact 
which is legally essential to the punishment”). 
7 See Apprendi, 530 US at 489 n 15 (citing 1 Bishop at § 81 at 51) (cited in note 6); id at 510 (Thomas, 
J, concurring), quoting 1 Bishop at § 81 at 51 (cited in note 6); see also Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296, 
301–02 (2004), quoting 1 Bishop at § 87 at 55 (cited in note 6). 
8 See Section V. 
9 See US Const, Amend VI. See also US Const, Art III, § 2 (“The trial of all crimes, except in cases of 
impeachment, shall be by jury”).  
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subset of those factual issues. Numerous sources from before, during, and after the 
nation’s founding indicate that the scope of the jury right hinged on the distinction 
between questions of fact and questions of law, not on whether a fact might “aggravate” 
or “mitigate” a defendant’s guilt or punishment, or on whether it qualifies as an 
“element” of a crime.  
 
One must first understand how the Constitution’s text and early **300 American 
practice regarded the criminal jury as a structural mechanism designed to limit the power 
of individual judges and preserve popular participation in the judiciary.10 Article III of the 
Constitution provided that “[t]he trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall 
be by jury,” and this was originally understood as providing a nonwaiveable jury in 
federal criminal trials.11 Many state constitutions were likewise understood to provide a 
nonwaiveable jury in felony criminal cases,12 which defendants could avoid only by 
pleading guilty and waiving their entire right to trial.13 In refusing to permit criminal 
defendants to consent to bench trials, courts noted that such trials would confer power on 
judges beyond that which the law allowed,14 sometimes even describing the jury’s **301 
                                                 
10 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131, 1182–99 (1991); 
Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 Cornell L Rev 203, 218 
(1995); Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 19 (Chicago, 1981) (describing the jury as a 
means to preserve “the role of the people in the administration of government”). See also John Adams, 2 
The Works of John Adams 253 (Little, Brown, 1850) (Charles F. Adams, ed) (diary entry, Feb 12, 1771) 
(“the common people [ ] should have as complete a control” over the judiciary as over the legislature); 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to L’Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), reprinted in Thomas Jefferson, 15 The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 282, 283 (Princeton, 1958) (Julian Boyd, ed) (“Were I called upon to decide 
whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to 
leave them out of the Legislative.”); Letters From The Federal Farmer (XV), in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 2 
The Complete Anti-Federalist 320 (Chicago, 1981) (writing that the jury “secure[s] to the people at large, 
their just and rightful controul in the judicial department”); Letters From The Federal Farmer (IV), in id at 
249 (“It is essential in every free country, that common people should have a part and share of influence, in 
the judicial as well as in the legislative department.”); Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 
293–94 (Vintage, 1945) (“The institution of the jury . . . places the real direction of society in the hands of 
the governed, . . . and not in that of the government. . . . The jury system as it is understood in America 
appears to me to be as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal 
suffrage.”). 
11 See Thompson v Utah, 170 US 343, 353–54 (1898). 
12 See, e.g., Harris v People, 21 NE 563, 565 (Ill 1889); Cancemi v People, 18 NY 128, 138 (1858); 
Hill v People, 16 Mich 351, 355–59 (1868); State v Lockwood, 43 Wis 403, 405 (1877); State v Ellis, 60 P 
136, 137–38 (Wash 1900); State v Mansfield, 41 Mo 470, 479 (1867); Michaelson v Beemer, 101 NW 
1007, 1008 (Neb 1904).  
13 Cf. John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal Jury 
Trial, 15 Harv J L & Pub Policy 119, 121 (1992) (noting that criminal defendants could waive the right to 
jury trial by pleading guilty). 
14 See, e.g., Harris v People, 21 NE 563, 564 (Ill 1889) (“But while a defendant may waive his right to 
a jury trial [by pleading guilty], he can not by such waiver confer jurisdiction to try him upon a tribunal 
which has no such jurisdiction by law. . . . For the trial of felonies the judge alone is not the court. The 
judicial functions brought into exercise in such trials are parceled out between him and the jury, and so long 
as there is no law authorizing it, the functions to be exercised by the jury might just as well be transferred, 
by agreement of the parties, to the clerk or sheriff as to the judge.”); Cancemi v People, 18 NY 128, 138 
(1858) (holding the right of jury trial nonwaiveable on the ground that “the trial must be by the tribunal and 
in the mode which the constitution and laws provide.”); State v Mansfield, 41 Mo 470, 478 (1867) (“His 
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role in jurisdictional terms.15 Nonwaivability was a paradigmatic example of how the 
criminal jury was understood to limit the power of individual judges.16  
 
The idea of a nonwaiveable criminal jury eventually fell out of fashion.17 But this 
trend did not repudiate, nor is it inconsistent with, the idea that the criminal jury plays an 
important structural role in limiting judicial power and preserving popular control in the 
judiciary. Rather, it is best seen as an allowance that a defendant’s right not to be tried by 
a jury (perhaps rooted in due process, or a broader autonomy principle) may trump the 
structural dimension of the jury guarantee. Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
the jury right, even at the state level, continues to serve systemic values beyond 
protecting individual defendants. In Taylor v Louisiana,18 for example, the Court held 
that excluding women from juries violated a male defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of 
jury trial. It allowed the defendant to challenge his conviction if his jury was not drawn 
from “a fair cross section of the community,”19 even if the juror exclusions skewed the 
jury pool in favor of the defendant’s race, sex, or social class, and without regard to 
whether **302 such exclusions were harmless.20 In so holding the Court relied on the 
jury’s role as an instrument of popular sovereignty; excluding groups from jury duty was 
“at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and representative 
government.”21 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
right to be tried by a jury of twelve men is not a mere privilege; it is a positive requirement of the law. . . . 
[H]e has no power to consent to the creation of a new tribunal unknown to the law to try his offence.”). 
15 See, e.g., Morgan v People, 26 NE 651 (Ill 1891) (“Consent of the defendant . . . can not confer 
jurisdiction upon the judge, or dispense with a finding of the fact of guilt before a jury.”); Neales v State, 10 
Mo 498, 500 (1847) (“It is exclusively the province of a jury to try the issue of not guilty, and the consent 
of the defendant for the court to try the same [ ] cannot confer such power on the court.”); Craig v State, 30 
NE 1120, 1122 (Ohio 1892) (“[T]he court of common pleas had no authority to try the case without [a 
jury]. It was a mode of trial unknown to the law. The legislature had not clothed the court with that form of 
jurisdiction, and no act or consent of the accused could create or confer a jurisdiction not established by 
law.”); see also Charles Hughes, Hughes’ Criminal Law § 2979, at 776 (Bowen-Merrill, 1901) (“A jury 
cannot be waived in a felony case—even by agreement or consent of the defendant. It is jurisdictional, and 
consent can never confer jurisdiction.”); Stewart Rapalje, A Treatise on Criminal Procedure § 151, at 227 
(Bancroft-Whitney, 1889) (“A trial without jury is a trial without jurisdiction.”). 
16 See John Proffatt, A Treatise on Trial by Jury § 113, at 157 (S. Whitney, 1877) (“[T]he 
constitutional provisions do not concede the right to waive the jury in criminal cases; for it is deemed, in 
such cases there are more than personal interests involved, that the rights and interests of the public are also 
concerned.”).  
17 See, e.g., Patton v United States, 281 US 276, 298–99 (1930) (allowing criminal bench trials in 
Article III courts); Susan C. Towne, The Historical Origins of Bench Trial for Serious Crime, 26 Am J 
Legal Hist 123, 145 (1982). 
18 419 US 522 (1975). 
19 Id at 527. 
20 Id at 538–539 (Rehnquist, J, dissenting) (protesting that the Court had reversed a conviction 
“without a suggestion, much less a showing, that the appellant has been unfairly treated or prejudiced in 
any way by the manner in which his jury was selected.”). 
21 Id at 527 (quoting Smith v Texas, 311 US 128, 130 (1940)). See also Blakely v Washington, 542 US 
296, 305–06 (2004) (describing the jury right as “no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental 
reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in 
the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary”); Georgia 
v McCollum, 505 US 42 (1992) (holding that criminal defendants may not use preemptory challenges in a 
racially discriminatory manner, even if a defendant would benefit from doing so).  
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Only until very recently, it was widely understood that criminal juries served 
these structural functions by preventing trial judges from resolving disputed questions of 
fact. William Blackstone declared that “[t]he principles and axioms of law . . . should be 
deposited in the breasts of the judges . . . . But in settling and adjusting a question of fact 
. . . a competent number of sensible and upright jurymen . . . will be found the best 
investigators of truth and the surest guardians of public justice.”22 And Lord Coke wrote 
that “ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices [judges do not answer a question of 
fact] . . . ad quaestionem juris non respondent juratores [jurors do not answer a question 
of law].”23 Section nine of the Judiciary Act of 1789 also embraced this view of the 
criminal jury’s role. After establishing exclusive jurisdiction in the federal district courts 
over certain crimes and offenses, the Act provided that “the trial in issues of fact, in the 
district courts, in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 
shall be by jury.”24 And while opinion at the time of the Founding was divided as to 
whether the criminal jury should also decide questions of law,25 **303 no one ever 
suggested that trial judges should displace the jury’s role in resolving factual disputes. 
Many state criminal codes expressly provided that juries were to resolve disputed 
questions of fact,26 and early state-court decisions similarly described the criminal jury’s 
role as extending beyond the elements of crimes to include all disputed questions of fact, 
leaving judges to decide questions of law.27  
 
The Supreme Court of the United States continued to endorse this view of the 
criminal jury throughout the early twentieth century. Even when it rejected the 
“nonwaiveable” jury in Patton v United States,28 the Court emphasized that the jury’s 
                                                 
22 See William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England *380 (Chicago, 1979). 
23 See, e.g., Edward Coke, 1 Commentary on Littleton § 155b (J. & W.T. Clarke, 19th ed 1832); see 
also Edward Wynne, 3 Eunomus: or Dialogues Concerning the Law and Constitution of England 217 § 53 
(B. White, 2d ed 1785); R. v Poole, 95 Eng Rep 15, 18 (KB 1734); Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the 
Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant’s Right to Jury Trial, 65 Notre Dame L Rev 1, 4 (1989). 
24 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat 73, 77 (1789) (emphases added). 
25 Compare Federal Farmer (XV), Storing, 7 The Complete Anti-Federalist at 319–20 (cited in note 10) 
(arguing that criminal juries should have the right to “decide both as to law and fact, whenever blended 
together in the issue put to them”); with Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the L’Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789) 
(cited in note 10) (arguing that juries “are not qualified to judge questions of law”). See also Mark Howe, 
Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv L Rev 582 (1939). 
26 See, e.g., Iowa Code § 4439 (1873); Dig Stat Ark, ch 52 § 149 (1848); Mo Rev Stat, ch 138, art 6, 
§ 1 (1845); 7 Tex Crim Proc, art 676 (1879); Stat Okla (Terr), ch 68, art 10, § 4 (1893); Cal Stat 255 § 398 
(1851); Gen Laws Kan, ch 32, § 215 (1862); Or Rev Stat 264, at ch 37, § 2 (1855).  
27 See Commonwealth v Porter, 51 Mass 263, 276 (1845) (opinion of Shaw, CJ); 
Commonwealth v Anthes, 71 Mass 185, 198 (1855) (opinion of Shaw, CJ); Duffy v People, 26 NY 588, 595 
(1863); Harris v People, 21 NE 563, 563 (Ill 1889); Commonwealth v Garth, 30 Va 761, 762 (1827); 
Townsend v State, 2 Blackf 151, 157–58 (Ind 1828); People v Barthleman, 52 P 112, 114 (Cal 1898); State 
v Hudspeth, 51 SW 483, 487 (Mo 1899); State v Dickinson, 55 P 539, 541 (Mont 1898); State v Magers, 57 
P 197, 201 (Or 1899); State v Lightfoot, 78 NW 41, 44 (Iowa 1899); People v Cignarle, 17 NE 135, 140 
(NY 1888). See also State v Spayde, 80 NW 1058, 1059 (Iowa 1899); McCullough v State, 34 SW 753, 754 
(Tex Ct Crim App 1896).  
28 281 US 276 (1930). 
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constitutional role presumptively extends to all issues of fact.29 And several modern court 
decisions recognized that criminal juries should resolve disputed questions of fact, even 
when such facts do not qualify as “elements” of crimes.30 Most significantly, a 1961 
opinion by Judge Henry Friendly extended the Sixth Amendment jury right beyond 
“elements” to sentencing factors that mitigate a defendant’s sentence. In that case, United 
States v Kramer,31 the relevant statute **304 provided that anyone convicted of theft of 
United States property “[s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more 
than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, 
he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”32 
The court recognized that the value of the property was not an “element of the crime,” 
but rather was a “fact going only to the degree of punishment.”33 Nevertheless, Judge 
Friendly’s opinion held that the district court should instruct the jury to determine not 
only whether Kramer was guilty of “the offense charged,” but also whether the property 
had a value of in excess of $100.34 The Court simply took for granted the proposition that 
“the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to have that fact determined by the jury rather 
than by the sentencing judge.”35  
 
 Given the jury’s structural role in limiting judicial power, and the authorities from 
the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries holding that juries served this function by 
keeping judges from deciding questions of fact, the most natural response for the 
Apprendi Court was to extend the Sixth Amendment jury right to any disputed factual 
question that aggravates or mitigates a defendant’s guilt or punishment. But the Supreme 
Court did not adopt this approach, because it had unwittingly tied the jury right to its 
proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement, which attaches only to “elements” of 
crimes. Part II discusses the Court’s reasonable-doubt jurisprudence and explains why the 
Court’s “elements” test, which defines the scope of the reasonable-doubt rule, should not 
similarly define the scope of the Sixth Amendment jury guarantee. 
                                                 
29 Id at 312 (“Trial by jury is the normal and, with occasional exceptions, the preferable mode of 
disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases above the grade of petty offense.”). See also Dimick v Shiedt, 
293 US 474, 485–86 (1934); Quercia v United States, 289 US 466, 469 (1933).  
30 See, e.g., Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68, 81 (1985) (stating that juries are to be “primary factfinders” 
on the issue of a criminal defendant’s psychiatric condition); Sherman v United States, 356 US 369, 377 
(1958) (noting the unanimous view of the federal courts of appeals that entrapment defenses fall within the 
jury’s purview); United States v Southwell, 432 F3d 1050 (9th Cir 2006) (holding that a criminal defendant 
has a constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict on the affirmative defense of insanity). See also 
United States v Jackalow, 66 US 484, 487 (1861) (holding that the jury should determine whether a 
criminal offense was committed out of the jurisdiction of a State, because it was “not a simple question of 
law”). 
31 289 F2d 909 (2d Cir 1961). 
32 Id at 920 n 8 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 USC § 641 (1994) (modified 1994)).  
33 Id at 921.  
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
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II. 
 
A. 
 
 Long before Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process clause 
requires prosecutors to prove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal 
prosecutions.36 But the Court did not extend this requirement to every question of fact 
that affects **305 a defendant’s guilt or punishment. Martin v Ohio,37 for example, 
upheld a state’s requirement that criminal defendants prove self-defense, an “affirmative 
defense” that absolves defendants of guilt. Patterson v New York38 approved a statute that 
required murder defendants to prove that they killed while acting “under the influence of 
extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or 
excuse.”39 This “mitigating circumstance,” if proved, would reduce the crime from 
murder to first-degree manslaughter.40 And McMillan v Pennsylvania41 refused to extend 
the Court’s proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement to “sentencing considerations” 
that were not components of a substantive crime.  
 
All these decisions limited the constitutional reasonable-doubt rule to facts 
characterized as “elements.”42 “Elements” are facts that the prosecution must establish in 
every case to secure a conviction for a criminal “offense.”43 Facts on which a criminal 
defendant must offer evidence, by contrast, do not qualify as “elements.” An “affirmative 
defense,” for example, is an issue on which a defendant bears the burden of production; 
the prosecutor need not offer any proof unless the accused produces enough evidence to 
put the fact in issue.44 “Mitigating circumstances” are facts on which a criminal defendant 
rather than the government carries the burden of persuasion.45 And facts that affect only a 
defendant’s sentence, rather than his guilt or innocence of an offense, also did not qualify 
as “elements” of a substantive crime.  
 
Because legislatures define the substantive criminal law, this **306 proof-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement amounted to little more than a default rule that 
legislatures could avoid by characterizing facts as affirmative defenses, mitigating 
circumstances, or sentencing considerations. If a jurisdiction wanted to amend its 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364 (1970).   
37 480 US 229 (1987).  
38 432 US 197 (1977).  
39 Id at 206, 218–19 (quoting NY Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 2006)). 
40 NY Penal Law § 125.20(2) (McKinney 2006). 
41 477 US 79 (1986). 
42 See Martin, 480 US at 233–234; Patterson, 432 US at 210; McMillan, 477 US at 85–86.  
43 See, e.g., Richardson v United States, 526 US 813, 817 (1999). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 559 
(West, 8th ed 2004) (defining “element” as “[a] constituent part of a claim that must be proved for the 
claim to succeed”).  
44 See Model Penal Code § 1.12(2) (ALI 1962). Once the accused satisfies his burden of production, 
then the burden of persuasion might rest with either the prosecution or the defense. See id at § 1.12(4).  
45 See, e.g., 18 USC § 3593(c) (2000 & Supp 2002) (providing that capital defendants must establish 
mitigating factors by a preponderance of the information); United States v Washman, 128 F3d 1305, 1307 
(9th Cir 1997) (“The defendant has the burden of proof with respect to any sentence reduction based upon a 
mitigating factor.”). 
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statutory-rape laws so that guilt or punishment would depend on the perpetrator’s 
knowledge of the victim’s age, it could make such knowledge an “element” of the crime, 
which would trigger the Court’s reasonable-doubt rule. But it could instead opt to 
establish the defendant’s lack of knowledge as an “affirmative defense” or a “mitigating 
circumstance” that would not implicate the Court’s proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
requirement.46 Or it might enact a “sentencing factor” that requires higher minimum 
penalties in cases where the defendant knew the victim was underage. That would 
likewise avoid the Court’s reasonable-doubt rule.  
 
The Supreme Court recognized that legislatures might go to extremes in 
structuring their criminal codes to evade the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
requirement,47 and emphasized that “there are obviously constitutional limits beyond 
which the States may not go” in this regard.48 The Court insisted that every crime contain 
at least one “element” subject to the reasonable-doubt standard,49 though it did not further 
specify these “obvious constitutional limits” on legislative attempts to avoid the Court’s 
reasonable-doubt rule. The Court did, however, acknowledge the obvious: That the 
“applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard” has “always been dependent on how a 
State defines the offense that is charged in any given case.”50 
 
B. 
 
 Several commentators have criticized this formalism in the **307 Court’s 
reasonable-doubt jurisprudence, and have urged the Court to expand the reasonable-doubt 
rule beyond “elements” to include affirmative defenses or mitigating circumstances.51 
But this was not a realistic option for the Supreme Court. First, there was no source of 
authority for the Court to impose such an expansive reasonable-doubt rule as a 
constitutional requirement. The Constitution’s text does not mention standards of proof in 
criminal cases, so the Court instead relied on tradition to justify its reasonable-doubt rule 
as a constitutional due-process requirement.52 Yet the traditional scope of proof-beyond-
                                                 
46 See, e.g., 18 USC § 2243(a), (c) (2000 & Supp 2006) (criminalizing consensual sexual acts with 
minors under the age of 16 and at least four years younger than the defendant, yet providing that in such 
prosecutions, “it is a defense, which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the defendant reasonably believed that the other person had attained the age of 16 years”). 
47 See Patterson, 432 US at 210–211 & n 12. 
48 See id at 210. 
49 See id (stating that a legislature cannot “declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a 
crime,” and cannot “create a presumption of all of the facts essential to guilt”) (quoting McFarland v 
American Sugar Rfg. Co., 241 US 79, 86 (1916), and Tot v United States, 319 US 463, 469 (1943)).  
50 See 432 US at 211 n 12.  
51 See generally, e.g., Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of 
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale L J 1299 (1977); Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the 
Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 Cal L Rev 1665 (1987); Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the 
Meaning of Innocence, 40 Hastings L J 457 (1989).  
52 See, e.g., Winship, 397 US at 361–62 (observing that the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
“dates at least from our early years as a Nation” and noting the “virtually unanimous adherence to the 
reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions”). But see Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination 
of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 BU L Rev 507, 519–24 (1975) (claiming that states 
did not regularly employ the reasonable-doubt rule until the 1820s, and that many other states did not 
instruct juries in reasonable-doubt terms until 1850 or later). 
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a-reasonable-doubt was limited. Both English and American law long required criminal 
defendants to bear some burden of proof on “affirmative defenses” such as insanity and 
self-defense.53 Prohibiting this time-honored burden-shifting in the name of a rule found 
in tradition would be an opportunistic and unprincipled use of tradition as a source of 
legal authority. This is not, however, a reason to similarly limit the right of jury trial, 
which has a different historical pedigree. There is no longstanding tradition suggesting 
that certain categories of facts should be excluded from the jury’s factfinding role. 
Indeed, to the extent that history informs the meaning of the criminal jury guarantee, it 
suggests that juries should simply resolve “questions of fact,” regardless of the standard 
of proof.54  
 
Second, an expansive reasonable-doubt rule could defeat one of the Court’s stated 
purposes for imposing proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a constitutional requirement. 
When the Court inferred this standard-of-proof requirement from the Due Process clause, 
it explained that such a rule was necessary to “command the respect and confidence of 
the community in applications of **308 the criminal law.”55 But if the Supreme Court 
required prosecutors to disprove all affirmative defenses or mitigating facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt, many jurisdictions would repeal or constrict the scope of existing 
defenses and be reluctant to recognize new ones. The upshot would be more crude and 
overinclusive definitions of crimes that do not sufficiently account for mitigating 
circumstances,56 forcing less culpable defendants to rely on more capricious and less 
transparent devices such as prosecutorial discretion or jury nullification. Such an outcome 
could actually sap public respect for the criminal justice system, contrary to the goals that 
led the Court to constitutionalize the reasonable-doubt rule in the first place.  
 
But again, these concerns should not necessarily lead to corresponding limits on 
the scope of the Sixth Amendment jury right. It is doubtful that extending the jury right to 
affirmative defenses of mitigating facts would tilt the substantive criminal law in a 
manner that provokes legislative correction. Expanding the jury’s factfinding role at the 
expense of judges would not be likely to increase the odds of acquittal in the way that 
heightening the government’s burden of proof would; indeed, empirical data show that 
acquittal rates are actually lower in jury trials than in bench trials.57 But even if the 
political branches were to respond by removing certain facts from the jury’s domain by 
broadening the scope of criminal liability, such a response would not undermine the 
purposes of the jury guarantee by, for example, allowing judges to resolve disputed issues 
of fact. Finally, even if an expansive jury role will hurt some criminal defendants in the 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *201 (cited in note 22) (stating that at common law the 
criminal defendant bore the burden of proving “all [ ] circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation”).  
54 See Section I. 
55 Winship, 397 US at 364. 
56 See Patterson, 432 US at 207–209, 214 n 15.  
57 See, e.g., James P. Levine, Jury Toughness: The Impact of Conservatism on Criminal Jury Verdicts, 
29 Crime & Delinquency 71, 78, 85–87 (1983) (analyzing nearly 125,000 jury trials and over 50,000 bench 
trials in federal and state jurisdictions throughout the United States and concluding that juries were more 
likely to convict than judges); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges so Acquittal Prone?, 83 Wash 
U L Q 151, 152 (2005) (noting that from 1989 to 2002, the average conviction rate in federal court was 84 
percent for jury trials, but 55 percent for bench trials). 
Apprendi’s Domain  2006 Supreme Court Review 297 
 
  
 10 
 
long run by provoking legislative responses that broaden substantive crimes or toughen 
sentences, such considerations should be as irrelevant as they were in Taylor, where the 
Court’s decision might have worked to the long-term detriment of criminal defendants, 
yet the Court **309 elided these concerns in its efforts to vindicate popular participation 
in the judicial branches of government.  
 
Third, when the Constitution allows governments to abolish affirmative defenses 
or mitigating circumstances, it is hard to justify a constitutional barrier to regimes that 
merely ease the government’s burden of proof on such facts.58 But this sort of reasoning, 
which holds that a legislature’s “greater power” to abolish a defense logically entails the 
“lesser power” to define the standards of proof, cannot justify similar limits on the right 
of jury trial. Because the jury right is a structural right designed to promote popular 
sovereignty and limit judicial power over factfinding, there is nothing illogical about 
insisting that juries determine affirmative defenses or mitigating circumstances while 
acknowledging a legislature’s “greater power” to repeal any such defenses or mitigating 
facts. In either case, the principle of popular sovereignty will be preserved, either by the 
jury’s factfindings, or by the decision of elected officials that an issue should not be 
relevant in determining guilt or punishment. On top of that, the Sixth Amendment’s text 
provides a right of jury trial “in all criminal prosecutions,” no matter how a legislature 
chooses to define its substantive criminal law. That a legislature might remove facts from 
the jury by making the substantive criminal law more harsh does not render the Sixth 
Amendment jury right inapplicable when it provides affirmative defenses and mitigating 
facts in criminal prosecutions as a matter of grace. The reasonable-doubt rule, by 
contrast, lacks these structural dimensions, and there is no textual hook in the 
Constitution that suggests its scope, so it is far more sensible for the Court to regard it as 
a default rule, applicable only to facts characterized as “elements,” which avoids the 
illogical consequences from a more expansive rule. 
 
Each of these considerations compelled the Court to limit the reasonable-doubt 
rule to the “elements” of criminal offenses, but none of them justifies similar limits on the 
constitutional jury guarantee. Yet the Supreme Court’s cases have simply assumed that 
the jury right, like the reasonable-doubt rule, should attach only to “elements” of offenses 
or their “functional equivalents.” **310 Part III explains the origins of this misguided 
idea and shows how it became the foundation of the Court’s Apprendi jurisprudence. The 
culprits are two 1986 Supreme Court decisions: Cabana v Bullock59 and McMillan v 
Pennsylvania.60 
 
                                                 
58 See Patterson, 432 US at 207–08. See also Ronald Jay Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme 
Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law—An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 Tex 
L Rev 269, 284–285 (1977); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. and Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and 
Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L J 1325, 1345 (1979). 
59 474 US 376 (1986).  
60 477 US 79 (1986).  
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III. 
 
A. 
 
 In 1986, the Supreme Court issued two decisions that used the concept of 
“elements” to define the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to “trial [ ] by an impartial 
jury.” The first of these cases, Cabana v Bullock, held that the Sixth Amendment did not 
require juries to make “Enmund findings” in death-penalty trials.61 These findings had 
been required by an earlier Court decision that limited capital punishment to persons who 
killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.62 The respondents in Cabana argued that such 
Enmund findings were “constitutionally equivalent to elements of an offense,”63 and the 
Court rejected this contention. But its opinion went further, suggesting that the 
respondents’ Sixth Amendment claim failed because the Enmund findings were not 
“elements” of the substantive crime of murder. Wrote the Court:  
 
A defendant charged with a serious crime has the right to have a jury determine 
his guilt or innocence. . . . [O]ur ruling in Enmund does not concern the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant—it establishes no new elements of the crime of 
murder that must be found by the jury.64  
 
This left an unfortunate implication that the Sixth Amendment jury right extends only to 
“elements.” Yet the Court did not in any way explain why the concept of “elements” 
should determine the scope of a jury’s constitutional factfinding responsibilities.  
 
**311 McMillan v Pennsylvania65 established a more explicit link between the 
jury right and the “elements” of crimes subject to the Court’s reasonable-doubt rule. 
There the Court upheld a state law that imposed a five-year mandatory minimum 
sentence in cases where a judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
defendant “visibly possessed a firearm” when committing his crime.66 The statute insisted 
that this was not an element of an offense, but a sentencing factor to be considered only 
after a defendant’s conviction for a predicate crime.67 Yet the petitioners maintained that 
the “visible possession of a firearm” finding was akin to an element and should therefore 
be subject to the Court’s reasonable-doubt rule.  
 
The Court rejected this contention, concluding that the “visible possession of a 
firearm” should not be treated as an element and need not be proved beyond a reasonable 
                                                 
61 474 US 376. The Supreme Court’s later in decision Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584 (2002), casts doubt 
on Cabana’s continued validity. See notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
62 See Enmund v Florida, 458 US 752, 801 (1982). 
63 Brief for Respondent, Cabana v Bullock, No 84-1236, *22 (filed Sep 9, 1985) (available on Lexis at 
1984 US Briefs 1236). 
64 Cabana, 474 US at 3384–85 (emphasis added). 
65 477 US 79 (1986).  
66 See id at 81 n 1(quoting 42 Pa Cons Stat § 9712(a) (1982)).  
67 See id at 81 n 1 (quoting 42 Pa Cons Stat § 9712(b) (1995)) (“Provisions of this section shall not be 
an element of the crime”).  
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doubt.68 It emphasized that a legislature’s definitions of crimes are “usually 
dispositive,”69 and accepted Pennsylvania’s characterization of this fact as a “sentencing 
factor” affecting only the level of punishment for a crime.70 The Court mentioned two 
situations in which legislative designations of “sentencing factors” might present more 
serious constitutional concerns: First, the Court warned against sentencing factors that 
serve as “a tail which wags the dog of a substantive offense.”71 The Court did not 
elaborate on the meaning of that phrase, nor did it provide examples. Second, the Court 
wrote that the petitioners’ reasonable-doubt claim “would have at least more superficial 
appeal” if the “visible possession” finding increased the maximum allowable punishment 
for a crime, rather than increasing only the minimum punishment.72 The Court’s overall 
analysis, however, recognized considerable legislative control over standards of proof, 
consistent with prior decisions establishing the reasonable-doubt requirement as a default 
rule that legislatures **312 may avoid by characterizing facts as something other than 
“elements.” 
 
The petitioners in McMillan also argued that the Sixth Amendment required a jury 
to decide whether they “visibly possessed a firearm.” But they did not base this claim on 
their earlier argument that this fact was akin to an “element.” Instead, the petitioners 
maintained that the Sixth Amendment jury right should attach to any factual 
determinations concerning the alleged criminal conduct, regardless of whether such facts 
qualified as “elements” or whether they increased or decreased a defendant’s sentence.73 
They conceded that “historical facts” such as a defendant’s criminal history need not be 
submitted to juries because such facts do not pertain to underlying criminal conduct.74 
Indeed, the DC Circuit’s decision in Jordan v United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia75 had previously endorsed this distinction between facts relating to “the 
manner in which a crime was committed” and “historical” facts such as recidivism, 
requiring juries to determine the former but allowing judges to decide the latter.76 The 
petitioners’ brief cited that case along with numerous legal authorities supporting the 
view that juries should resolve disputed questions of fact relating to underlying criminal 
conduct.77 
 
But the McMillan Court held, without any analysis, that the right of jury trial 
extends only to “elements” of crimes, and not to “sentencing factors.” Given its earlier 
conclusion that the “visual possession of a firearm” finding was not an element, the Court 
                                                 
68 Id at 88.  
69 Id at 85. 
70 Id at 85–86.  
71 Id at 88. See also id at 89–90. 
72 Id at 88. 
73 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, McMillan v Pennsylvania, No 85-215, *33–38 (filed Dec 2, 1985) 
(available on Westlaw at 1985 WL 670131). 
74 See id at *33 n 38.  
75 233 F2d 362 (DC Cir 1956).  
76 Id at 367. 
77 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at *35 (cited in note 73) (citing Edward Wynne, 3 Eunomus, or 
Dialogues Concerning the Law and Constitution of England § 53, at 205–07 (1768)); id at *35 n 40 
(quoting John Hawles, The Englishman’s Right. A dialogue between a Barrister at Law, and a Juryman 8 
(R. Janeway, 1680)).  
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wrote that the petitioners’ Sixth Amendment claim “merit[ed] little discussion,” and 
tossed it aside in a perfunctory sentence: “Having concluded that Pennsylvania may 
properly treat visible possession as a sentencing consideration and not an element of any 
offense, we need only note that there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, 
even where the sentence turns on specific findings of **313 fact.”78 This was a woefully 
inadequate response to the petitioners’ argument.  
 
First, the petitioners never asserted anything resembling a “right to jury 
sentencing.” They advanced a more limited and nuanced claim: That the Sixth 
Amendment required juries to determine all “critical facts” relating to the alleged 
criminal conduct, as opposed to “historical facts” such as a defendant’s character and 
background. To be sure, some of these “critical facts” may affect the ultimate sentencing 
decision. In McMillan, for example, the “visible possession of a firearm” finding would 
lead to a minimum five-year prison sentence. But requiring a jury to decide such “critical 
facts” is a far cry from requiring the jury to choose the ultimate sentence. Indeed, the 
petitioners’ brief expressly disclaimed any constitutional right to jury sentencing, and 
carefully explained why their argument did not imply such a right.79 Their argument no 
more implicated a “right to jury sentencing” than the Supreme Court’s holding in Ring v 
Arizona80 that juries must find statutory aggravating factors in death penalty cases.81 
 
Second, the McMillan Court gave no reasons for limiting the jury right to the 
“elements” subject to the Court’s reasonable-doubt rule. Its opinion parroted the slapdash 
analysis in the respondents’ brief, which asserted (without reasons or citations) that the 
Sixth Amendment jury right extends only to “elements” of crimes,82 and raised the straw 
man of a right to jury sentencing in response to the petitioners’ Sixth Amendment 
argument.83 But neither the Court nor the respondents attempted to explain why the 
“elements” test should define the jury’s constitutional factfinding role. This silence was 
especially puzzling given that the Second Circuit’s Kramer opinion, authored by Judge 
Friendly, had already extended the Sixth Amendment jury right beyond the “el- **314 
ements” of criminal offenses to “sentencing facts” that affected only a defendant’s 
punishment.84  
 
In every case subsequent to McMillan, the Justices and the Court’s practitioners 
have labored under its unsupported premise that the jury right is co-extensive with the 
                                                 
78 McMillan, 477 US at 93 (citing Spaziano v Florida, 468 US 447, 459 (1984)). 
79 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at *38 (cited in note 73). 
80 536 US 584 (2002).  
81 See id at 597 n 4 (“Ring’s claim is tightly delineated: He contends only that the Sixth Amendment 
required jury findings on the aggravating circumstances asserted against him. . . . [H]e [does not] argue 
that the Sixth Amendment required the jury to make the ultimate determination whether to impose the death 
penalty.”) (emphasis added). 
82 See Brief for Respondent, McMillan v Pennsylvania, No 85-215, *12–13 (filed Oct 1985) (available 
on Westlaw at 1985 WL 670135). 
83 See id at *13 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the sixth amendment requires a sentencing jury. It 
is clear that the sixth amendment carries no such requirement. There is no sixth amendment right to jury 
sentencing”) (citing Spaziano, 468 US at 460). 
84 See United States v Kramer, 289 F2d 909, 920–21 (2d Cir 1961). See also notes 31–35 and 
accompanying text. 
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reasonable-doubt rule, attaching only to “elements” of crimes. Several post-McMillan 
decisions, for example, refused to extend the right of jury trial to aggravating factors that 
render a defendant eligible for capital punishment on the ground that such facts are not 
“elements” of crimes.85 And in Sullivan v Louisiana,86 the Court made the connection 
even more explicit, writing, “It is self-evident, we think, that the Fifth Amendment 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement 
of a jury verdict are interrelated.”87 Sullivan went on to hold that a constitutionally 
deficient reasonable-doubt instruction violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of 
jury trial, because “the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”88 It did not account for the possibility that the Sixth 
Amendment might require jury findings on factual issues outside the scope of the 
reasonable-doubt rule.89 
 
Perhaps the most dramatic post-McMillan opinion linking the scope of the jury 
right with the reasonable-doubt rule and the concept of “elements” was Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Monge v California.90 Monge held that a court’s refusal to find a sentencing 
enhancement is not an “acquittal” of an “offense” for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
clause. Justice Scalia’s dissent, however, argu- **315 ed that sentencing enhancements 
that increase a defendant’s maximum allowable sentence are akin to “elements” of a 
separate, aggravated “crime,” and that refusals to find such enhancements represent 
“functiona[l] acquit[als]” of such crimes.91 Then he went even further, claiming that the 
concept of “elements” defined the scope of the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial as 
well as the Double Jeopardy clause and the reasonable-doubt rule:  
 
“The fundamental distinction between facts that are elements of a criminal 
offense and facts that go only to the sentence provides the foundation for our 
entire double jeopardy jurisprudence . . . . The same distinction also delimits the 
boundaries of other important constitutional rights, like the Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by jury and the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”92 
 
Justice Scalia’s Monge dissent presaged the Court’s Apprendi jurisprudence in 
two ways. First, it expressly linked the right of jury trial with the reasonable-doubt rule, 
                                                 
85 See, e.g., Clemons v Mississippi, 494 US 738, 745–746 (1990); Hildwin v Florida, 490 US 638, 
639–41 (1989); Walton v Arizona, 497 US 639, 647–49 (1990). The Court overruled these cases in Ring v 
Arizona, 536 US 584, 609 (2002) (holding that statutory aggravating factors in death-penalty cases are the 
“functional equivalent” of “elements,” and must therefore be found by a jury) (quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 
494 n 19).  
86 508 US 275 (1993). 
87 Id at 278. 
88 Id (emphasis added). 
89 See also United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506, 510 (1995) (“[The Fifth and Sixth Amendments] 
require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element 
of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.”); id at 511 (“The Constitution gives a 
criminal defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with 
which he is charged.”). 
90 524 US 721 (1998).  
91 See id at 741 (Scalia, J, dissenting).  
92 Id at 738 (Scalia, J, dissenting) (emphasis added).  
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and limited both to “elements” of “crimes.” Second, it sought to give meaningful content 
to the jury right and other constitutional provisions by setting forth an expansive view of 
“elements” that does not depend on labels used in criminal codes, and turns instead on 
whether a fact increases the range of punishment to which a defendant is exposed. 
Subpart B describes how the Court’s Apprendi jurisprudence endorsed and expanded on 
the approach that Justice Scalia urged in Monge.  
 
B. 
 
Apprendi v New Jersey perpetuated the Supreme Court’s link between the jury 
right and the reasonable-doubt rule. The petitioner had pleaded guilty to a firearms 
offense that normally carried a maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment.93 But the 
trial court imposed a twelve-year sentence because of New Jersey’s hate-crimes law, 
which increased the maximum allowable sentence to twenty years’ imprisonment if a trial 
judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant acted with a “purpose 
**316 to intimidate” an individual because of race.94 The petitioner protested that this 
regime violated his right of jury trial and the Court’s proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
rule. 
 
Once again, the Court proceeded as if the jury right and the reasonable-doubt rule 
were identical in scope. The Court described its proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
requirement as “the companion right” to the right of jury trial,95 with each extending to 
the “elements” of crimes: “Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal 
defendant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with 
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’”96 
 
 Unlike prior decisions, however, the Apprendi Court refused to limit these 
protections to facts designated as “elements” in criminal codes, an approach that would 
allow legislatures to circumvent the jury right by redesignating “elements” as “sentencing 
factors.”97 Instead, the Court decided that the concept of “elements” should depend on 
effects at sentencing rather than labels used in statutes. It claimed that historical practice 
showed that “facts that expose a defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise 
legally prescribed were by definition ‘elements’ of a separate legal offense.”98 From this 
                                                 
93 See NJ Stat Ann § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 2006). 
94 See NJ Stat Ann § 2C:44-3(e) (West 2001) (repealed by 2001 NJ Sess Law Serv 443 (West)). 
95 Apprendi, 530 US at 478.  
96 Id at 477 (emphases added) (citations omitted). See also id at 484 (describing the extent of 
“Winship’s due process and associated jury protections”) (emphasis added); id at 483–84 (“[P]ractice must 
at least adhere to the basic principles undergirding the requirements of trying to a jury all facts necessary to 
constitute a statutory offense, and proving those facts beyond reasonable doubt.”).  
97 See id at 494 (noting that “[l]abels do not afford an acceptable answer”) (citation omitted); see also 
Ring, 536 US at 605 (“[T]he characterization of a fact or circumstance as an ‘element’ or a ‘sentencing 
factor’ is not determinative of the question ‘who decides,’ judge or jury.”).  
98 Apprendi, 530 US at 483 n 10. The Court also cited with approval the portions of Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence that argued that courts historically treated such sentencing enhancements as elements of 
separate, aggravated crimes. Id (citing Apprendi, 530 US at 501–04 (Thomas, J, concurring)).  
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observation the Court held that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction,99 that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the “maximum authorized statutory **317 
sentence” is the “functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,”100 and must be 
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.101 The Court distinguished 
McMillan, where the sentencing enhancement increased only the minimum punishment, 
and did not raise the statutory maximum.102 
 
 Justice Thomas’s concurrence argued for an even broader view of “elements.”103 
He agreed that courts should look beyond a legislature’s designations, but he thought that 
“elements” should include any fact established by law as a basis for imposing or 
increasing punishment, even if such facts do not raise the “statutory maximum” 
punishment.104 He urged the Court to overrule McMillan, because facts establishing 
mandatory minimums increase a defendant’s punishment and should therefore be deemed 
“elements.” But he acknowledged that “fact[s] that mitigat[e] punishment” are not 
“elements” subject to the constitutional jury or standard-of-proof requirements.105  
  
 Post-Apprendi decisions continued to link the scope of the jury right with the 
reasonable-doubt rule and the concept of “elements.” In Harris v United States,106 the 
Court reaffirmed McMillan’s holding that sentencing facts that impose mandatory 
minimums, without increasing a defendant’s maximum allowable punishment, are not 
“elements” for constitutional purposes, and need not be charged by prosecutors, 
submitted to juries, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The plurality opinion, like 
McMillan, assumed that the jury’s constitutional factfinding responsibilities extended 
only to “elements” of crimes, and did not consider the possibility that they might extend 
beyond that; the plurality wrote that facts that “are not elements are thus not subject to 
the Constitution’s . . . jury . . . requirements.”107 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment 
based on his continued disagreement with Ap- **318  prendi’s holding; he claimed that 
he could not “easily distinguish Apprendi v New Jersey from this case.”108 But whatever 
tension may exist between Apprendi and the Harris plurality opinion, they have this 
much in common: Each opinion links the jury right with the reasonable-doubt rule and 
limits both to the “elements” of crimes or their “functional equivalents.” 
 
                                                 
99 The Court excluded recidivist sentencing enhancements because of its decision in Almendarez-
Torres v United States, 523 US 224, 226-27 (1998) (holding that 8 USC § 1326(b)(2) (2000), which 
enhances penalties for recidivist criminals, was not an “element” of a crime and need not be charged in an 
indictment, even if it increases the maximum punishment that could otherwise be imposed).  
100 Apprendi, 530 US at 494 n 19 (emphasis added).  
101 Id at 490. See also id at 494 n 19 (“[W]hen the term ‘sentence enhancement’ is used to describe an 
increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, . . . it fits squarely within the usual definition 
of an ‘element’ of the offense.”). 
102 See id at 487 n 13.  
103 See id at 499–523 (Thomas, J, concurring). 
104 Id at 501 (Thomas, J, concurring).  
105 See id at 500, 501 (Thomas, J, concurring). 
106 536 US 545 (2002).  
107 Id at 549 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).  
108 Id at 569 (Breyer, J, concurring in the judgment). 
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Three more decisions reaffirmed and clarified the scope of Apprendi. Ring v 
Arizona109 held that aggravating factors that render a defendant eligible for capital 
punishment are “functional equivalent[s]” of “element[s],” which must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.110 Blakely v Washington111 clarified that Apprendi applies to 
any fact that increases the maximum sentence that could be imposed based solely on facts 
found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.112 Finally, United States v Booker113 found 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional to the extent that they allowed 
judicial factfinding to increase a defendant’s maximum allowable penalty. To remedy this 
constitutional defect, the Court decided to invalidate the statutory provisions that made 
the Guidelines mandatory.114 As advisory Guidelines, judicial factfinding would no 
longer alter “statutory maximum” sentences and would not implicate the Apprendi rule. 
Throughout its opinion, however, the Court reaffirmed and recited Apprendi’s 
formulation that linked the scope of the jury right with the reasonable-doubt **319 
rule.115  
 
 
   Factfinder: 
Standard of Proof: Right to Jury Determination No Right to Jury 
Proof Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt 
Required 
Elements 
“Apprendi facts” (or “Functional 
Equivalents” of Elements) 
 
Less than Proof 
Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt Allowed 
 All Other Sentencing 
Factors 
 
Fig. 1 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the Court’s current approach to the constitutional jury and 
standard-of-proof requirements in felony prosecutions. This approach leaves the bottom-
left and top-right boxes as null sets.116 But tying the jury right with the reasonable-doubt 
rule has created two serious problems in the Court’s Apprendi jurisprudence. Part IV 
                                                 
109 536 US 584 (2002). 
110 Id at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 494 n 19). This overruled earlier decisions holding that the 
Sixth Amendment did not require jury findings on such aggravating factors. See note 85. 
111 542 US 296 (2004).  
112 See id at 303–04 (“In other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a 
judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional 
findings.”).  
113 543 US 220 (2005).  
114 Id at 244–268.  
115 See, e.g., id at 230–31, 244.  
116 Because the Supreme Court has held that juries are not required for “petty” offenses, see, e.g., 
Blanton v City of North Las Vegas, 489 US 538 (1989), there may be situations in certain non-felony 
prosecutions where the Court’s jurisprudence would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt without 
requiring a jury determination. But as for felony prosecutions, the Court treats the jury right and the 
reasonable-doubt rule as coterminous. 
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shows that the Court has failed to provide “intelligible content” to the right of jury trial 
because it has trapped the jury right within the reasonable-doubt rule’s formalism. 
Because the Court cannot extend the reasonable-doubt rule to affirmative defenses and 
“mitigating” circumstances, its Apprendi jurisprudence excludes “mitigating” sentencing 
facts from the jury’s domain, producing an overly formalistic jury right that is easily 
evaded by legislatures. Worse, there is no sound basis on which to distinguish 
“aggravating” from “mitigating” sentencing facts for purposes of the Sixth Amendment 
jury right. Deciding that a so-called “mitigating” fact has not been proved will increase a 
defendant’s sentence from that which would otherwise be imposed, no less than finding 
that an “aggravating” fact has been proved. Part V shows that Apprendi’s all-too-limited 
limited efforts to expand the jury right has led courts to adopt overbroad and historically 
indefensible understandings of “elements” and “crimes.” 
 
IV. 
 
A. 
 
Although the Supreme Court claims that Apprendi gives “intelligible content to 
the right of jury trial,”117 its failure to extend **320 the jury right to facts that mitigate 
punishment allows legislatures and sentencing commissions to continue to shift 
factfinding power from juries to judges, either by converting “elements” of crimes into 
affirmative defenses, or by transforming aggravating sentencing facts into mitigators that 
describe the absence of aggravating conduct.118 This loophole is a result of the Court’s 
unwillingness to extend the reasonable-doubt rule to such facts, and its unwarranted 
assumption that the jury right can extend no further.  
 
To see this, suppose a legislature or sentencing commission provided a penalty 
range of 10 to 20 years for a firearms offense, which drops to 5 to 10 years if the 
defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not act “with a purpose 
to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race.” Neither Apprendi’s 
holding nor the more expansive rule urged in Justice Thomas’s concurrence would have 
anything to say about this, even though the judge decides whether the defendant will be 
exposed to a sentence beyond ten years’ imprisonment.119 The courts would intervene 
only if they regarded the “purpose to intimidate” issue as a “tail which wags the dog of a 
substantive offense.”120 
                                                 
117 Blakely, 542 US at 305.  
118 See Apprendi, 530 US at 540–543 (O’Connor, J, dissenting); Blakely, 542 US at 339 (Breyer, J, 
dissenting); Jones v United States, 526 US 227, 267 (1999) (Kennedy, J, dissenting); Frank O. Bowman, 
III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U Chi Legal 
F 149, 197 (noting that the conversion of aggravating factors into mitigators “was for some time following 
Blakely the favored option of important decisionmakers in the Justice Department and among some key 
congressional staff”); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph 
of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 Geo L J 183, 198 (2005) (concluding 
that Apprendi “will not suffice to prevent erosion of” the jury right because it is “remarkably easy to 
evade”).  
119 See Apprendi, 530 US at 490 n 16; id at 501 (Thomas, J, concurring). 
120 McMillan, 477 US at 88. 
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 The Apprendi Court was unfazed by this scenario. It predicted that the political 
branches would acquiesce, and would not try to recast sentencing enhancements as 
“mitigating facts” that describe the absence of aggravating conduct. Such action “seems 
remote,” the Court explained, because “structural democratic constraints” would 
discourage legislatures or sentencing commissions from evading the jury right in this 
fashion.121 For this reason, the Court felt that it was not necessary to extend the jury right 
to mitigating sentencing facts. 
 
**321 The Court’s reliance on “structural democratic constraints” as a means to 
protect the jury’s factfinding responsibilities from legislative evasion is not convincing. 
Any such decision to rely on political safeguards over judicial enforcement of a 
constitutional norm should be justified by institutional considerations. There must be 
concrete reasons to believe either that courts are ill-equipped to fully enforce a 
constitutional principle, or that the political branches will respect a constitutional norm 
without the courts’ help. The Court’s reluctance to enforce a strong “nondelegation 
doctrine,” for example, can be defended by institutional difficulties in fashioning a 
principled judicial doctrine that distinguishes between permissible and impermissible 
delegations.122 And court decisions that rely on “political safeguards” to protect norms of 
constitutional federalism provide specific institutional reasons to be sanguine about 
Congress’s willingness to respect state prerogatives.123 This sort of institutional analysis 
is necessary to prevent the concept of “political safeguards” from becoming a convenient 
cubbyhole into which judges can relegate disfavored constitutional provisions for 
underenforcement. 
 
 Yet the Apprendi opinion did not note any institutional problems that might arise 
if courts were to extend the jury right to mitigating sentencing facts. Although Justice 
Breyer’s dissent asserted that such a regime would be impracticable, on the ground that 
there are “far too many potentially relevant sentencing factors to permit submission of all 
(or even many) of them to a jury,”124 this seems an overstatement. Such regimes are 
already the norm for capital sentencing; the Federal Death Penalty Act (and many state 
laws) require jurors to make findings on every relevant mitigating and aggravating factor 
during the sentencing phase.125 And the number **322 of mitigating facts in such capital 
cases is potentially infinite; federal law requires jurors to consider “any mitigating factor” 
                                                 
121 Apprendi, 530 US at 490 n 16.   
122 See, e.g., Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J, dissenting) (“[W]hile the 
doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional 
system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts. . . . [W]e have almost never felt qualified to 
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those 
executing or applying the law.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 
Mich L Rev 303, 311 (1999) (describing the nondelegation doctrine as a “genuine, but judicially 
underenforced, constitutional norm”).  
123 See, e.g., Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 551 (1985); see 
generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 Colum L Rev 543 (1954); Larry D. 
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum L Rev 215 
(2000).  
124 Apprendi, 530 US at 557 (Breyer, J, dissenting).  
125 See, e.g., 18 USC § 3593(d) (2000). 
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beyond the eight enumerated factors in the death-penalty statute.126  California’s Penal 
Code similarly requires jurors to consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the 
gravity of the crime,”127 which, in one capital case, allowed jury consideration of a dance 
choreography prize that the defendant received while in prison.128 The widespread use of 
such regimes makes it difficult to see any institutional problems with requiring juries to 
find mitigating sentencing facts along with sentencing enhancements that raise the 
maximum punishment.  
 
More importantly, the Apprendi opinion offered no reasons to believe that 
political processes will preserve a meaningful factfinding role for the jury, absent a 
requirement that juries find all disputed sentencing factors, including mitigators. Jury 
factfinding in criminal sentencing has little political currency. During recent House 
Judiciary Committee hearings on responses to Booker, none of the four witnesses 
proposed a system in which the jury would play any factfinding role at sentencing.129 Nor 
is this surprising. Even William Blackstone, who praised the criminal jury as “the grand 
bulwark” of English liberties,130 recognized that jury factfinding produces 
“inconveniences,”131 and strong political constituencies naturally coalesce behind more 
convenient principles such as equality and even-handedness in the criminal justice 
system. Tough-on-crime politicians want sentencing uniformity and predictability as a 
means to promote deterrence. And politicians that sympathize with the criminal defense 
bar, or with criminal suspects, are equally unlikely to advocate a system that produces 
disparities in criminal punishment. On top of this, the future criminal defendants who 
might benefit from jury factfinding are unknown, and cannot lobby for an expansive jury 
right. For all these **323 reasons, the right of jury trial seems an especially poor 
candidate for reliance on political safeguards or for treatment as an “underenforced 
constitutional norm.”132  
 
 Apprendi therefore amounts to little more than an option for legislatures or 
sentencing commissions to choose between jury fact-finding (by creating sentencing facts 
that purport to “aggravate” a defendant’s maximum allowable sentence) or judge 
factfinding (by creating “mitigating” sentencing facts that describe the absence of 
aggravating conduct). Although the reasonable-doubt rule is similarly structured as a 
default rule that legislatures may evade, in that situation the court could not justify an 
expansive rule that attaches to “affirmative defenses,” or “mitigating circumstances,” so 
an easily evaded standard-of-proof requirement was the lesser of two evils. But the 
Court’s valid reasons for limiting the reasonable-doubt requirement as a default rule do 
                                                 
126 See 18 USC § 3593(c) (2000 & Supp 2002) (emphasis added). See also 18 USC § 3593(d) (2000). 
127 Cal Penal Code § 190.3(k) (West 2006). 
128 See Boyde v California, 494 US 370, 382 n 5 (1990). 
129 See United States v. Booker: One Year Later—Chaos or Status Quo? Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (2006); see also Douglas 
A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 Houston L Rev 341, 371–72 
(2006). 
130 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *342 (cited in note 22). 
131 Id at *343–344.  
132 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212 (1978).  
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not carry over to the jury right,133 and it is hard to see how treating the jury right as a 
default rule is consistent with the Supreme Court’s stated goal of giving “intelligible 
content” the right of jury trial.  
 
B. 
 
 Apprendi’s conception of the jury right suffers from a more serious problem: 
There is no coherent basis to distinguish “facts in aggravation of punishment” from “facts 
in mitigation”134 for purposes of the right of jury trial. Consider again the hypothetical 
discussed in subsection A, where conviction for a firearms offense triggers a penalty 
range of 10 to 20 years, which drops to 5 to 10 years if the defendant proves, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he did not act “with a purpose to intimidate an 
individual or group of individuals because of race.” This regime is functionally identical 
to what the Supreme Court nixed in Apprendi; in both cases the defendant’s maximum 
sentence will be increased ten years if a judge concludes that it is more likely than not 
that he acted with a biased purpose to intimidate. The only difference is that the defense 
(rather than the prosecution) bears the burden of proof on the “purpose to intimidate” 
issue. But **324 legislative choices that allocate burdens of proof should not affect 
constitutional requirements regarding the identity of the factfinder; the Court’s contrary 
view is another unfortunate result of its decision to link the jury right with its standard-of-
proof requirements.  
 
Neither Apprendi nor subsequent cases made a serious effort to explain how 
“aggravating” and “mitigating” facts can be distinguished for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, given that a failure to find a “mitigating” fact enhances a defendant’s maximum 
sentence just as surely as an “aggravator.” All that Apprendi had to say was that judicial 
determinations of “mitigating” facts “neither expos[e] the defendant to a deprivation of 
liberty greater than that authorized by the [jury’s] verdict,” nor “impos[e] upon the 
defendant a greater stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict alone.”135 But this 
analysis is circular; the extent of punishment and stigma “authorized” by the jury’s 
verdict itself depends on whether the defendant can establish the relevant “mitigating 
facts.”  
 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence defended this distinction between “aggravating” 
and “mitigating” sentencing facts by arguing that the jury right should extend only to 
facts that are “a basis for imposing or increasing punishment.”136 This, however, is a non 
sequitur. When a “mitigating” circumstance decreases a defendant’s maximum allowable 
sentence, the absence of that circumstance is a “basis for imposing” any punishment 
exceeding the mitigated penalty range. Recall Patterson v New York, where New York 
provided an affirmative defense for those who killed “under the influence of extreme 
emotional disturbance.”137 That the defendant had not acted under the influence of 
                                                 
133 See Section II.B. 
134 See Apprendi, 530 US at 490 n 16.  
135 Id. 
136 See id at 501 (Thomas, J, concurring).  
137 NY Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a). 
Apprendi’s Domain  2006 Supreme Court Review 297 
 
  
 22 
 
“extreme emotional disturbance” was the “basis” for sentencing him to life 
imprisonment, rather than a reduced penalty. Even though the defendant bore the burden 
of proof on this issue, the factual determination was as much a “basis” for his punishment 
as the fact that he caused the death of another human being. Each fact was necessary to 
expose him to life imprisonment. 
 
The Court’s Apprendi jurisprudence fails to recognize that sentencing facts are 
“aggravating” or “mitigating” only in relation to **325 some baseline from which 
departures are measured.138 Just as the failure to confer a property-tax exemption can 
“penalize” a constitutional right,139 so too the refusal to find a “mitigating” fact can 
“increase” a defendant’s otherwise applicable maximum sentence. To see this, consider 
once again our earlier hypothetical, where conviction for a firearms offense triggers 10 to 
20 years’ imprisonment, unless the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he did not act with a “purpose to intimidate an individual or group of 
individuals because of race,” which drops the penalty to 5 to 10 years. One might view 
this sentencing fact as “lowering” the maximum sentence from 20 to 10 years in cases 
where the defendant satisfies his burden of proof. This perspective uses the 20-year 
maximum sentence as its benchmark, the highest possible penalty the judge could 
impose. Yet one might instead view a defendant’s failure to satisfy his burden of proof as 
triggering a “penalty” that raises his maximum punishment from 10 to 20 years. This 
view uses the lower of the two sentencing ranges as the baseline for measurement.  
 
Blakely v Washington140 purported to adopt a baseline when it defined the 
“statutory maximum” as the highest sentence a judge may impose “solely on the basis of 
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”141 The Court 
explained: “[T]he relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 
additional findings.”142 It is not immediately clear what this means; modern sentencing 
regimes almost always require some assessment of factual evidence before a “maximum 
sentence” can be ascertained. Consider again our aforementioned hypothetical sentencing 
regime; the judge must make some decision regarding whether the defendant satisfied his 
burden of proof on the “purpose to intimidate” mitigator before any “maximum sentence” 
can be ascertained. If he decides that the **326 defendant proved that he did not act with 
a biased “purpose to intimidate,” the maximum punishment is 10 years. Otherwise the 
judge would decide that the defendant failed to carry his burden of proof on this issue, 
which triggers a 20-year maximum. There is no “statutory maximum” that can be 
ascertained without some decision regarding a party’s ability to carry his burden on the 
existence of sentencing facts.  
 
                                                 
138 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum L Rev 873 (1987). 
139 See Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513 (1958). 
140 542 US 296 (2004).  
141 See id at 303 (emphasis omitted). 
142 See id at 303–04. See also Cunningham v California, 127 S Ct 856, 869 (2007) (holding that “the 
jury’s verdict alone” must authorize a sentence to comport with the Sixth Amendment).  
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The Blakely Court seems to be suggesting that its “statutory maximum” baseline 
is the highest sentence a court may impose, if all sentencing facts are resolved adversely 
to the party bearing the burden of proof. On this view, when a party fails to satisfy its 
burden of proof with regard to a sentencing fact, there is no “finding” that alters the 
baseline punishment. That means that when criminal defendants bear the burden of proof 
with regard to a sentencing fact, it is a “mitigating fact” that need not be submitted to the 
jury. By contrast, when prosecutors bear the burden of proof with regard to a sentencing 
fact, it is an “aggravating fact” and belongs to the jury if it increases the baseline 
maximum punishment.  
 
But the Court has provided no reasons why the scope of the jury right should 
depend on who bears the burden of proof, and none is apparent. A determination that a 
“mitigating” sentencing fact has not been established exposes the defendant to 
punishment beyond that which he would otherwise receive; the effect is no different from 
finding an aggravating fact that increases the maximum punishment beyond what could 
otherwise be imposed. The only difference is that the defendant has been assigned the 
burden of proof in the former case. The Constitution may allow legislatures or sentencing 
commissions to choose how to allocate burdens of proof given the limited scope of the 
reasonable-doubt rule,143 but why should this affect what the Constitution requires 
regarding the identity of the factfinder, especially when there is no difference in the effect 
of the factfinder’s decision? Allowing the right to a jury determination to depend on 
legislative decisions to allocate the burdens and standards of proof seems arbitrary. 
 
Not only is this baseline arbitrary, it is almost entirely within the control of the 
political branches. When constitutional rights **327 are at stake, the Supreme Court 
rarely allows its analysis to proceed from baselines over which the political branches 
have near-plenary control. That much is clear from the many decisions in the Court’s 
“unconstitutional conditions” genre.144 It is hard to see why the Sixth Amendment jury 
right should be different in this regard, nor has the court suggested a reason why. While 
the Court allows the scope of its constitutional reasonable-doubt requirement to depend 
on decisions of the political branches, those limits are necessary to prevent the Court 
from overstepping its authority by expanding the reasonable-doubt requirement beyond 
its traditional scope, and to avoid creating incentives for crude and overinclusive criminal 
laws that would defeat the Court’s stated purposes for the reasonable-doubt rule.145 None 
of these reasons carries over to the jury right.  
 
Finally, some sentencing statutes do not specify which party bears the burden of 
proof, making it difficult to determine whether a sentencing fact increases or decreases 
the “statutory maximum” under Blakely. Consider the a few provisions of the federal 
drug statutes, which establish a range of penalties that depend on drug type and 
quantity.146 For persons convicted of distributing marijuana, 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(C) 
                                                 
143 See Section II.  
144 See, e.g., FCC v League of Women Voters, 468 US 364, 399–401 (1984); Sherbert v Verner, 374 
US 398, 405–06 (1963); Arkansas Writers’ Project v Ragland, 481 US 221, 229 (1987). 
145 See Section II.B. 
146 See 21 USC § 841(b)(1)–(4) (2000 & Supp 2002). 
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provides a maximum sentence of 20 years, plus fine. But then 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(D) 
provides that persons distributing less than 50 kilograms of marijuana may be punished 
with a sentence of no more than five years’ imprisonment (plus fine). And 21 USC § 
841(b)(4) goes even further, saying that those who distributed only “a small amount of 
marijuana for no remuneration” may not imprisoned for more than one year. Yet nowhere 
does the statute specify whether the prosecution or the defense must prove whether the 
amount of marijuana falls within the ranges provided in sections 841(b)(1)(D) or 
841(b)(4).147 Hence, the statute does not indicate whether the “statutory maximum” under 
Blakely should be the 20 years’ imprisonment plus fine provided in section 841(b)(1)(C), 
the five years’ impris- **328 onment plus fine provided in section 841(b)(1)(D), or the 
one year in prison plus fine allowed by section 841(b)(4). Judges are left with little 
guidance in choosing from among these options.148 
 
In some respects, Apprendi’s attempt to distinguish “aggravating” and 
“mitigating” facts contains echoes of the “right/privilege” distinction that used to hold 
sway in constitutional law.149 The Justices might think that facts that purport to increase a 
defendant’s maximum allowable punishment implicate his “right” to be free from 
confinement, whereas facts that decrease the maximum punishment confer a “privilege” 
and therefore do not implicate the Sixth Amendment jury right. Justice Scalia’s Apprendi 
concurrence contained shades of this reasoning, claiming that it was “not unfair to tell a 
prospective felon that if he commits his contemplated crime he is exposing himself to a 
jail sentence of 30 years—and that if, upon conviction, he gets anything less than that he 
may thank the mercy of a tenderhearted judge.”150  
 
The problem with this view is that mitigating facts that lower a defendant’s 
maximum allowable sentence do not confer “privileges” or “mercy” when they represent 
legal entitlements to be free from certain levels of punishment. A judge who wrongfully 
withholds this entitlement does not fail to dispense mercy, but deprives the defendant of a 
legal claim to freedom. That such deprivation is accomplished by the failure to find a 
mitigating fact, as opposed to the finding of a sentencing enhancement, should make no 
difference for purposes of the jury right. The Supreme Court has recognized as much in 
its procedural due process cases, which have abandoned “right/privilege” analysis and 
protect all “entitlements” created by law.151 Similar reasoning should extend the jury 
right to “mitigating” sentencing facts, no less than aggravating **329 ones. But the Court 
cannot adopt this approach under its current jurisprudence because it is unwilling to 
                                                 
147 See United States v Brough, 243 F3d 1078, 1079 (7th Cir 2001) (“[T]he statute [§ 841] does not say 
who makes the findings or which party bears what burden of persuasion.”).  
148 Cf. United States v Outen, 286 F3d 622, 637–39 (2d Cir 2002) (holding that the “default” penalty 
for marijuana possession is the five-year term in 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(D) rather than the one-year term in 21 
USC § 841(b)(4)); United States v Campbell, 317 F3d 597, 603 (6th Cir 2003) (same). 
149 See, e.g., Barsky v Board of Regents, 347 US 442, 451 (1954) (upholding the suspension of a 
physician’s license on the ground that the license was “a privilege granted by the State under its 
substantially plenary power to fix the terms of admission”); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the 
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv L Rev 1439 (1967).  
150 Apprendi, 530 US at 498 (Scalia, J, concurring). See also Harris, 536 US at 565 (plurality opinion) 
(stating that conviction “authorize[s]” the government “to impose any sentence below the maximum”). 
151 See, e.g., Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 (1972).   
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countenance a corresponding expansion in the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
requirement and the concept of “elements.”  
 
V. 
 
A. 
 
 Part IV showed that the Supreme Court has failed to give “intelligible content” to 
the jury’s constitutional factfinding role because of its unjustifiable decision to link the 
jury right with the reasonable-doubt rule. Yet the problems caused by this linkage are 
even more far reaching. Under the Supreme Court’s precedents, whenever courts expand 
the jury right, they must bring along the reasonable-doubt rule and, with it, the 
“elements” label. As a result, Apprendi’s well-meaning efforts to strengthen the jury’s 
factfinding role have produced a regime in which prosecutors must prove certain 
sentencing enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt, and allege such facts in indictments 
in federal prosecutions, as if they were “elements” of a substantive crime.152 In the 
Supreme Court’s words, a non-recidivist fact that increases a defendant’s maximum 
allowable sentence must be treated as “the functional equivalent of an element of a 
greater offense.”153 
 
The Apprendi Court and Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion defended this 
outcome by claiming that sentencing enhancements had always been regarded as 
“elements” of substantive crimes whenever they increased a defendant’s maximum 
allowable punishment.154 They each relied on Joel Prentiss Bishop’s assertion **330 that 
nineteenth-century indictments were required to include “every fact which is legally 
essential to the punishment.”155 But this statement from Bishop’s Criminal Procedure 
treatise is flatly wrong; numerous nineteenth-century cases held that first-degree murder 
findings were not required to be charged in indictments as “elements” of a greater crime, 
even though they increased the maximum allowable sentence from life imprisonment to 
death, and even though they were to be determined by juries. They also demonstrate that 
the Court’s expansive concept of “elements” is historically indefensible, and that juries’ 
                                                 
152 See, e.g., United States v Cotton, 535 US 625, 632 (2002). See also, e.g., United States v Fields, 242 
F3d 393, 395–96 (DC Cir 2001) (holding that drug quantity under 21 USC § 841(b) “is an element of the 
offense” if it results in a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum, and that “the Government must state 
the drug type and quantity in the indictment”); United States v Promise, 255 F3d 150, 152 (4th Cir 2001) 
(holding that drug quantities under § 841(b) “must be treated as elements of aggravated drug trafficking 
offenses [and] charged in the indictment.”); United States v Doggett, 230 F3d 160, 164–65 (5th Cir 2000) 
(holding that drug quantity under § 841(b) is an “element” of a crime, which “must be stated in the 
indictment”); United States v Rebmann, 226 F3d 521, 524–25 (6th Cir 2000) (describing drug quantity 
under § 841(b) as “elements of the offense”); United States v Rogers, 228 F3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir 2000) 
(holding that drug quantity under § 841(b) “must be charged in the indictment”). But see United States v 
Bjorkman, 270 F3d 482, 489–90 (7th Cir 2001) (denying that Apprendi facts constitute “elements” of 
substantive crimes). 
153 Apprendi, 530 US at 494 n 19. 
154 See id at 483 n 10.  
155 See id at 489 n 15 (quoting 1 Bishop § 81 at 51 (cited in note 6)); id at 510 (Thomas, J, concurring) 
(same). 
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factfinding prerogatives have often extended beyond the “elements” of substantive crimes 
required to be alleged in indictments and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
B. 
 
 Justice Scalia’s Monge dissent first propounded the idea that sentencing 
enhancements should be deemed “elements” of substantive crimes whenever they expose 
a defendant to a new range of punishment.156 Two years later, the Apprendi Court 
endorsed this view, claiming that, as an historical matter, “facts that expose a defendant 
to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by definition 
‘elements’ of a separate legal offense.”157 To support this historical assertion, the Court 
cited nineteenth-century treatises.158 One of these was the Second Edition of Bishop’s 
Criminal Procedure treatise, which claimed that “every fact which is legally essential to 
the punishment” must be charged in an indictment and be treated as an ingredient of a 
substantive **331 crime.159 Bishop was among the preeminent nineteenth-century treatise 
writers on American law, and had been described by the Central Law Journal in 1885 as 
“the foremost law writer of the age.”160 Justice Thomas’s Apprendi concurrence also 
relied on Bishop’s treatise as evidence of “the traditional understanding . . . regarding the 
elements of a crime,”161 along with a handful of nineteenth-century state-court 
decisions.162 The Supreme Court later endorsed all of these sources as “relevant 
authorities” supporting Apprendi’s expansive theory of elements.163 None of these 
opinions, however, considered actual nineteenth-century court decisions involving 
sentencing categories in first-degree murder statutes. If they had, they would have 
realized that state courts almost uniformly rejected Bishop’s view of the indictment, as 
well as the proposition that sentencing enhancements must be treated as elements of 
substantive criminal offenses whenever they increase a defendant’s maximum allowable 
punishment.  
 
 Although Apprendi claimed that distinctions between “elements” and “sentencing 
factors” were unknown “during the years surrounding our Nation’s founding,”164 the 
                                                 
156 See 524 US at 737–38 (1998) (Scalia, J, dissenting). See also notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
157 Apprendi, 530 US at 483 n 10. See also Cunningham v California, 127 S Ct 856, 864 (2007) 
(“Apprendi said that any fact extending the defendant's sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the 
jury's verdict would have been considered an element of an aggravated crime . . . by those who framed the 
Bill of Rights.") (quoting Harris v United States, 536 US 545, 557 (2002) (plurality opinion)). 
158 See id at 480, citing John Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 51 (H. Sweet, 15th 
ed 1862) (John Jervis, ed); id at 489 n 15 (relying on 1 Bishop at § 81 at 51 (cited in note 6)). See also 
Blakely, 542 US at 301–02 (quoting Bishop in support of its claim that the jury must determine “all facts 
‘which the law makes essential to the punishment’”) (quoting 1 Bishop at § 87 at 55 (cited in note 6)).  
159 See Apprendi, 530 US at 489 n 15, quoting 1 Bishop at § 81 (cited in note 6). 
160 Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop’s Orthodoxy, 13 Law and Hist Rev 215, 215 (1995) (quoting Note, 
Mr. Bishop as Law Writer, 21 Cent L J 81, 81 (1885)). A note in the American Law Review heaped similar 
praise on Bishop. See Note, A Deserved Tribute, 18 Am L Rev 853, 853–54 (1884). 
161 Apprendi, 530 US at 510–12 (Thomas, J, concurring) (citing Bishop (cited in note 6) and Joel 
Prentiss Bishop, New Criminal Procedure or New Commentaries on the Law of Pleading and Evidence and 
the Practice in Criminal Cases (Flood, 4th ed 1895)).  
162 See id at 502–09; 512–518 (Thomas, J, concurring) (citing relevant state-law cases). 
163 See Blakely, 542 US at 302. 
164 Apprendi, 530 US at 478. 
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states have in fact employed “sentencing factors” since the early days of the Nation’s 
history. And numerous state-court decisions recognized that these facts were not 
“elements” of substantive crimes and did not need to be charged by prosecutors, even 
when they increased the maximum allowable punishment.165 In 1794, only three years 
after ratification of the Bill of Rights, Pennsylvania enacted a statute that divided the 
crime of murder into two degrees: Murder in the first degree was limited to murders 
“perpetrated by means of poi- **332 son, or lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, 
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or 
attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary.” 166 All other kinds of murders 
were second degree. Many other states adopted similar schemes. But only murder in the 
first degree was punishable by death, so a first-degree finding was the nineteenth-century 
analogue to a statutory “aggravating factor” in modern death-penalty statutes. Each 
would be a quintessential “Apprendi fact” under the Supreme Court’s current 
jurisprudence, which would be treated as the “functional equivalent of an element of a 
greater offense.”167  
 
But nineteenth-century courts did not regard a first-degree murder finding as an 
“element” of an aggravated crime, even though such findings increased the maximum 
allowable sentence from life imprisonment to death, and even though the law required 
jury determinations as to the degree of murder in cases that went to trial. White v 
Commonwealth168 was the first published decision construing Pennsylvania’s first-degree 
murder statute, and all the Justices of the state supreme court agreed that the first-degree 
murder statute did not divide murder into separate offenses. The majority opinion held 
that indictments need not charge the degree of murder because “first-degree” murder was 
merely a sentencing category within a unitary offense rather than an element of a 
separate, aggravated crime:  
 
“All that [the statute] does, is to define the different kinds of murder, which shall 
be ranked in different classes, and be subject to different punishments. It has not 
been the practice since the passing of this law, to alter the form of indictments for 
murder in any respect; and it plainly appears by the act itself, that it was not 
supposed any alteration would be made. It seems taken for granted, that it would 
not always appear on the face of the indictment of what degree the murder 
was.”169  
 
The dissenting opinion agreed that Pennsylvania’s first-degree **333 murder statute 
“creates no new offence as to willful and deliberate murder. . . . Different degrees of guilt 
exist under the general crime of murder.”170 Even though the Pennsylvania statute 
                                                 
165 See, e.g., Hanon v State, 63 Md 123, 126 (1885) (“The mere affixing by statute of a penalty 
different from that at common law, or adjusting it to specified circumstances of aggravation or mitigation, 
where the crime or misdemeanor is in its nature susceptible of such variations, without losing its essential 
characater, is not the creation of a distinct offence.”) (emphasis added).  
166 See 4 Journal of the Senate 242–46 (Pa 1794); see also Gen Laws Pa, ch 124 § 2 (Johnson 1849) 
167 See Ring v Arizona, 536 US at 609 (2002) (quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 494 n 19). 
168 6 Binn 179 (Pa 1813).  
169 See id at 183 (opinion of Tilghman, CJ) (emphasis added). 
170 Id at 188 (Yeates, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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conferred a right to a jury determination as to the first-degree murder finding,171 no one 
on the court regarded this jury fact as part of a substantive criminal offense, even as it 
increased the maximum allowable punishment from life imprisonment to death.  
 
After White, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued to hold that prosecutors 
need not charge the degree of murder in indictments.172 Other jurisdictions that divided 
murder into degrees likewise held that murder indictments need not mention the degree 
of the crime. These included the highest courts of Alabama,173 Arkansas,174 California,175 
Colorado,176 Idaho,177 Maine,178 Maryland,179 Massachusetts,180 Michigan,181 
Minnesota,182 the territory of Montana,183 Nevada,184 New Jersey,185 New Hampshire,186 
New **334 York,187 Tennessee,188 Texas,189 Virginia,190 West Virginia,191 and 
Wisconsin.192 While each of these courts held that murder indictments need not specify 
the degree of the crime, courts would not hold indictments invalid when they did so.193 
The California Supreme Court, for example, held that courts should simply disregard 
attempts in indictments to designate a degree of murder.194 And it allowed such 
indictments to sustain convictions for any degree of murder, even if higher than the 
                                                 
171 See Gen Laws Pa, ch 124, §2 (Johnson 1849). 
172 See, e.g., Commonwealth v Gable, 7 Serg & Rawle 423, 427 (Pa 1821) (opinion of Tilghman, CJ); 
id at 429 (Gibson, J, dissenting); Commonwealth v Flanagan, 7 Watts & Serg 415, 418 (Pa 1844); O’Mara 
v Commonwealth, 75 Pa 424, 429–30 (1874) (quoting White, 6 Binn at 182–83 (opinion of Tilghman, CJ)). 
173 See, e.g., Noles v State, 24 Ala 672, 693 (1854).  
174 See, e.g., McAdams v State, 25 Ark 405, 416 (1869). But see Cannon v State, 31 SW 150, 153 (Ark 
1895) (suggesting that first-degree murder should be alleged in indictments).  
175 See, e.g., People v Murray, 10 Cal 309, 310 (1858).  
176 See, e.g., Garvey v People, 6 Colo 559, 563 (1883).  
177 See, e.g., State v Ellington, 43 P 60, 61 (Idaho 1895).  
178 See, e.g., State v Verrill, 54 Me 408, 415–16 (1867).  
179 See, e.g., Ford v State, 12 Md 514, 529–30 (1859).  
180 See, e.g., Green v Commonwealth, 94 Mass 155, 170–71 (1866).  
181 See, e.g., People v Doe, 1 Mich 451, 457–58 (1850).  
182 See, e.g., State v Lessing, 16 Minn 75, 78 (1870). 
183 See, e.g., Territory v Stears, 2 Mont 324, 327–28 (1875).  
184 See, e.g., State v Millain, 3 Nev 409, 442 (1867). 
185 See, e.g., Titus v State, 7 A 621, 623 (NJ 1886) (stating that New Jersey’s first-degree murder 
statute “did not create any new crime, but ‘merely made a distinction, with a view to a difference in the 
punishment, between the most heinous and the less aggravated grades of the crime of murder.’ . . . [I]t [is] 
not necessary to set out in the count that the alleged killing was ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated,’ 
[and] it cannot be necessary to show that the killing was in the commission of a rape, which is another of 
the categories of the same section.”) (quoting Graves v State, 45 NJL 347, 358 (NJ 1883)). 
186 See, e.g., State v Williams, 23 NH 321, 324 (1851). 
187 See, e.g., Cox v People, 80 NY 500, 514 (1880).  
188 See, e.g., Mitchell v State, 16 Tenn 514, 527 (1835); id at 530–34 (Catron, CJ, concurring); see also 
Hines v State, 27 Tenn 597, 598 (1848).  
189 See, e.g., Gehrke v State, 13 Tex 568, 573–74 (1855).  
190 See, e.g., Commonwealth v Miller, 3 Va 310, 311 (1812).  
191 See, e.g., State v Schnelle, 24 W Va 767, 779 (1884).  
192 See, e.g., Hogan v State, 30 Wis 428, 439-42 (1872). 
193 See, e.g., People v Dolan, 9 Cal 576, 583 (1858).  
194 See People v King, 27 Cal 507, 512 (1865). See also People v White, 22 Wend 167, 175–76 (NY 
1839); Stears, 2 Mont at 328; Kirby v State, 15 Tenn 259, 264 (1834). 
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degree specified in the indictment.195 In so holding the court stressed that prosecutors and 
grand juries should not be allowed to designate sentencing categories at the charging 
stage; rather, such decisions should be made at the time of defendant’s conviction for a 
crime by the relevant factfinder, either a jury (in cases where the defendant opts for a 
trial) or trial judge (in cases where the defendant waives his right of trial by pleading 
guilty).196 The court seemed intent on preventing these sentencing categories from 
becoming a regime of “charge-offense” sentencing, and would not allow indictments to 
control sentencing decisions.197 All these decisions are directly contrary to the views of 
Bishop, who wrote that according to **335 “those principles of natural reason and justice 
which are inherent in the case, . . . the indictment for murder, where the statute divides it 
into two degrees, should, if murder of the first degree is meant to be proved against the 
prisoner, contain those allegations which show the offence to be in this degree.”198  
 
 Several of these state-court decisions considered and rejected the claim in 
Bishop’s treatise that indictments “must contain an allegation of every fact which is 
legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted.”199 State v Millain200 expressly 
disapproved Bishop’s views while rejecting a claim that first and second-degree murder 
were separate offenses, requiring distinct indictments.201 The Court noted that “Mr. 
Bishop has laboured with zeal and ingenuity to show the distinct nature of the two 
offenses,”202 but nevertheless concluded that “it was not the intention of the legislature, in 
making the distinction in the two classes of murder, to require a distinct indictment for 
each.”203 Indeed, the Court noted the “almost [] uniform practice” in other States 
allowing a generic murder indictment to sustain convictions for first-degree murder.204 In 
denying the petition for rehearing, the Court emphasized that it had “read with great care 
and attention the arguments of Mr. Bishop as to the necessity of an indictment for murder 
                                                 
195 See, e.g., People v Nichol, 34 Cal 211, 217 (1867). See also Stears, 2 Mont at 327. 
196 See, e.g., King, 27 Cal at 512 (“The trial jury, and not the grand jury, determine the degree of the 
crime, and the former should not be embarrassed by the opinion of the latter.”); Nichol, 34 Cal at 217 
(noting that the duty to fix the degree of crime is “expressly cast upon the trial jury, and the designation of 
the degree by the Grand Jury is, therefore, as idle as a recommendation to the mercy of the Court appended 
to a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree.”). 
197 See also Ellington, 43 P at 61 (“How are the jury to find the degree? From the descriptive 
allegations in the indictment, or from the evidence on the trial? . . . [T]he answer is unavoidable, as it is 
conclusive, that the degree of the crime is solely for the trial jury, and it is not requisite or essential that the 
words defining the degrees of murder should be set forth in the indictment to constitute a good indictment 
for murder in the first degree under our statutes.”) (emphasis added); Stears, 2 Mont at 327–328; State v 
Thompson, 12 Nev 140, 147–48 (1877); State v Rover, 10 Nev 388, 391 (1875); Mitchell, 16 Tenn at 533 
(Catron, CJ, concurring).  
198 2 Bishop at § 586 at 308 (cited in note 6).  
199 1 Bishop at § 81 at 51 (cited in note 6). See also id at § 540 (“[T]he indictment must . . . contain an 
averment of every particular thing which enters into the punishment”); Apprendi, 530 US at 510 (Thomas, 
J, concurring) (citing these provisions in Bishop’s treatise).  
200 3 Nev 409 (1867).  
201 See id at 439–40.  
202 Id. 
203 Id at 442. 
204 Id. 
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drawing the distinction between murder of the first and second degree.”205 But this did 
not persuade the Court to change its previous decision upholding the indictment.206 
 
 Hogan v State207 also rejected Bishop’s views in a case where a murder 
indictment omitted the degree. The dissenting opinion invoked Bishop’s treatise and 
argued that the indictment was **336 bad,208 but the majority opinion rejected this view, 
even while recognizing that an indictment “must fully set out the crime charged.”209 The 
majority noted the longstanding view in Wisconsin that murder indictments need not 
specify a degree to sustain a conviction for murder, even in the first degree. And it wrote 
that “[t]he acquiescence of a bar so able and learned as the bar of Wisconsin, and for so 
long a period, . . . and this without a word of dissent from the bench, brings such rule 
almost within the operation of the maxim, ‘stare decisis.’”210 The Court also observed 
that the state legislature had expressly approved the use of common-law form indictments 
in prosecutions for first-degree murder, and the Court refused to hold the statute 
unconstitutional. It therefore felt “constrained to hold that such express averment in 
unnecessary, and that an indictment in the common law form is sufficient.”211  
 
Finally, in State v Verrill,212 the defendant had been convicted and sentenced for 
first-degree murder based on an indictment that did not allege the degree, even though the 
state constitution had been construed to require “that all the elements of, or facts 
necessary to, the crime charged, shall be fully and clearly set out” in an indictment.213 On 
appeal, the defendant cited Bishop’s treatise214 to support his claim that his indictment 
should have alleged first-degree murder. But the Court rejected the defendant’s claim. 
Even though the first-degree murder finding increased the maximum punishment, it did 
not need to be charged in the indictment because it was not an element of a crime. The 
Court explained: “There is still but one crime denominated murder, as at the common 
law, although by the provisions of the statute there are two degrees of that crime, liable to 
different punishments.”215 
 
**337 All these jurisdictions made clear that they did not regard first and second-
degree murder as separate offenses. Instead, they viewed the degrees of murder as 
                                                 
205 Id at 479.  
206 Id.  
207 30 Wis 428 (1872).   
208 See id at 443 (Dixon, CJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
209 Id at 439 (majority). 
210 Id at 441.  
211 Id at 440.  
212 54 Me 408 (1867).  
213 Id at 414 (emphasis added).  
214 See id at 410, citing Joel Prentiss Bishop, 2 Criminal Procedure §§ 562–97 at 317–53 (Little, 
Brown, 1st ed 1866). 
215 Id at 415 (emphasis added). Other decisions rejected Bishop’s claim that indictments should allege 
every fact essential to guilt. See, e.g., Ellington, 43 P at 61–62; Territory v Bannigan, 46 NW 597, 599 
(Dakota 1877) (noting that “a long array of authorities” stands against Bishop’s assertion that indictments 
for first-degree murder “should” allege the degree). 
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nothing more than sentencing categories within a unitary offense, even though a first-
degree murder finding boosted the maximum punishment from imprisonment to death.216 
   
A few jurisdictions did require murder indictments to allege the degree of the 
crime.217 The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, held in Fouts v State218 that a common-
law indictment for murder, which did not specify the degree of crime, could not support 
conviction and punishment for first-degree murder. But the court recognized that its 
approach was in the minority, noting that common-law murder indictments were 
“perhaps good in nearly every other state in the Union.”219 And subsequent Iowa 
Supreme Court decisions again noted that Fouts was opposed to the views expressed in 
court decisions from other jurisdictions.220 The Missouri Supreme Court likewise 
acknowledged that other states had adopted a “different practice,” refusing to require 
indictments to allege first-degree murder, even under “statutes using somewhat similar 
phrases in declaring what shall be murder in the first degree, and what in the second 
degree.”221 
 
So while a few jurisdictions adopted Bishop’s view that indictments must charge 
every fact that increases a defendant’s punishment, the first-degree murder cases show 
that most jurisdictions rejected it, and did not necessarily regard sentencing 
enhancements as “elements” of separate, aggravated crimes that must be **338 charged 
in indictments, even when they raise the maximum punishment. The Supreme Court has 
not acknowledged or discussed these nineteenth-century first-degree murder cases, yet it 
relies on Bishop’s views to support revisionist understandings of “elements” and 
“crimes.” The first-degree murder cases demonstrate, however, that these statements 
from Bishop’s treatise were aspirational rather than an accurate description of nineteenth-
century American practice (much less evidence of what the US Constitution requires). 
Bishop himself recognized that the law of first-degree murder could not be reconciled 
with his claim that indictments must charge “every fact which is legally essential to the 
punishment” as an element of a crime.222 Indeed, he bemoaned the holdings of those 
cases, writing that “to a lamentable extent have our courts, not consulting the teachings of 
our books of the law, or resorting to accurate reasonings, done, upon the subject of the 
                                                 
216 See also Commonwealth v Gardner, 77 Mass 438, 444 (1858); People v Haun, 44 Cal 96, 98 
(1872); Thompson, 12 Nev at 146; Simpson v State, 19 SW 99, 102 (Ark 1892); State v Tatro, 50 Vt 483, 
493 (1878), quoting Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States § 1103 at 500 
(Kay, 4th ed 1857); Mitchell, 16 Tenn at 526. 
217 See, e.g., Finn v State, 5 Ind 400, 403 (1854); Fouts v State, 4 Greene 500, 503 (Iowa 1854); State v 
McCormick, 27 Iowa 402, 411–12 (1869) (citing Joel Prentiss Bishop, 2 Commentaries on the Law of 
Criminal Procedure, or Pleading, Evidence, and Practice in Criminal Cases § 584 at 333 (Little, Brown 
1st ed 1866) to support Fouts’s holding, and reiterating that “the degree [of murder] must be alleged”); 
State v Jones, 20 Mo 58, 60–61 (1854); State v Brown, 21 Kan 38, 49–50 (1878). 
218 4 Greene 500 (Iowa 1854).  
219 Id at 503. 
220 See State v Johnson, 8 Iowa 525, 529 (1859) (discussing Fouts); McCormick, 27 Iowa at 408 (“We 
are aware that the cases are not uniform respecting the question whether, to constitute a good indictment for 
murder in the first degree, it is necessary to allege that the killing was willful, deliberate and 
premeditated.”).  
221 See Jones, 20 Mo at 61.  
222 See, e.g., Joel Prentiss Bishop, 3 New Criminal Procedure §§ 500, 561–589 (Flood, 2d ed 1913). 
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indictment [in first-degree murder cases], the very highest champion blundering.”223 The 
Supreme Court might prefer Bishop’s aspirations to the actual practice of nineteenth-
century state courts as a matter of policy, but that by itself is not a legitimate basis on 
which to impose a constitutional rule regarding the meaning of “elements” or the 
requirements of the Fifth Amendment’s Indictment clause.224 
 
Although Justice Thomas’s Apprendi concurrence supplemented his reliance on 
Bishop’s treatise with a handful of nineteenth-century state-court decisions that spoke 
favorably of Bishop’s views, many of those same courts interpreted their first-degree 
murder statutes in a manner irreconcilable with Bishop’s views of the indictment and 
Justice Thomas’s understanding of “elements.”225 At most, Justice Thomas’s historical 
evidence shows that **339 some sentencing enhancements were charged in indictments 
in some situations. But there was no obligation, constitutional or otherwise, to treat every 
fact that increases the maximum allowable punishment as an element of a substantive 
crime. 
 
As further proof that the states did not regard sentencing enhancements as 
“elements” of substantive crimes, some states would not permit a criminal defendant to 
plead guilty to a specific degree of murder. They allowed him to plead guilty only to the 
unitary offense, and the trial judge would fix the degree and sentence, given that the 
defendant’s guilty plea waived his right to a jury.226 This was an early example of “real-
                                                 
223 See, e.g., id at § 500 at 277.  
224 See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty 
Pleas, 110 Yale L J 1097, 1132 (2001) (noting that Bishop’s “speculation about ‘natural reason’ and 
‘abstract justice’ is no basis for discerning the original meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments”); cf. 
John Hart Ely, Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv L Rev 5, 16–22 (1978). 
225 Compare Apprendi, 530 US at 511–512 (Thomas, J, concurring) (citing, among others, state-court 
decisions from Texas, Maryland, and Maine that spoke approvingly of Bishop’s views) with Gehrke, 13 
Tex at 573–74 (holding that an indictment charging murder in its common-law definition sufficient to 
sustain conviction and punishment for murder in the first degree); Ford, 12 Md at 549 (holding that there 
was “no defect in the indictment” that charged the defendant with common-law murder without specifying 
the degree). See also Verrill, 54 Me at 415–16 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “the indictment 
does not set out a murder in the first degree, therefore insufficient to sustain the verdict”). 
226 See, e.g., Weighorst v State, 7 Md 442 (1855) (“[T]he act does not authorize the accused to plead 
guilty of murder in the second degree. If he confesses at all he must plead to the indictment for murder, and 
it is then made the duty of the court, by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of the crime, and 
to give sentence accordingly.”); Dick v State, 3 Ohio St 89, 93 (1853) (“The prisoner is not allowed to 
determine the degree of the crime, by a confession with reference to the form and manner of the charge 
against him; but the degree must be found by the court, from the evidence, without regard to the form of the 
confession, or the mode in which the crime is charged in the indictment.”); Wells v State, 104 SW2d 451, 
452 (Ark 1937) (jury must find degree of murder even when defendant pleads guilty to an indictment 
charging first-degree murder); Martin v State, 38 SW 194, 196 (Tex Crim 1896) (“[A defendant] may plead 
guilty to murder, but the degree must be found by a jury.”); Wicks v Commonwealth, 4 Va 387, 392–93 
(1824) (“But the Law goes on to say, ‘but if such person be convicted by confession, the Court shall 
proceed, by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of the crime, and to give sentence 
accordingly.’ Now, if the Indictment must charge the offence to be murder in the first degree or second 
degree, and if the accused confesses he is guilty of the crime charged upon him by the Indictment, what 
further enquiry upon that subject can be had?”). But see State v Kring, 74 Mo 612, 620 (1881) (noting that 
defendant entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree); State v Shanley, 18 SE 734, 736 (W Va 
1893) (noting that a defendant “may plead guilty of murder in the first degree”).  
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offense” sentencing based on the defendant’s actual conduct, rather than charging 
decisions or plea-bargains.227 And this continued well into the twentieth century. The 
California Supreme Court, for example, held that trial courts must fix the degree of 
burglary whenever the defendant pleaded guilty to a generic burglary indictment.228 
These state-court decisions regarded “degrees” of crimes as real-offense sentencing 
categories rather than “elements” of substantive offenses that could be the subject of 
plea-bargaining. The federal courts have no historical basis for mandating that sentencing 
enhance- **340 ments be treated as elements of separate, aggravated criminal offenses 
that prosecutors must charge and prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
But the nineteenth-century law of first-degree murder fully supports Apprendi’s 
decision to expand the jury right to sentencing factors. Every jurisdiction that divided 
murder into degrees required juries to fix the degree of the crime, even though they did 
not treat this jury fact as an “element” of a substantive criminal offense. The only 
exception was when the defendant waived his right to trial by pleading guilty.229 But at 
the time, guilty pleas waived all rights that otherwise would apply at trial;230 even 
jurisdictions that regarded the criminal jury as “nonwaivable” recognized that guilty pleas 
obviated any factfinding role for the jury.231 In cases that did go to trial, many state courts 
jealously guarded the jury’s prerogative to fix the degree of murder, holding that a jury 
verdict of “guilty” that did not specify the degree of murder was a nullity, and could not 
support any punishment, even for the lowest possible degree.232 They would not permit 
                                                 
227 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon 
Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L Rev 1, 8–12 (1988) (explaining the differences between “charge-offense” 
and “real-offense” sentencing). 
228 See People v Jefferson, 52 Cal 452, 454–55 (1877) (citing section Cal Penal Code § 1192 (1872)); 
see also People v Stratton, 24 P2d 174, 176 (Cal App 1933). 
229 See Hallinger v Davis, 146 US 314 (1892). A few states, however, still required juries to determine 
the degree of murder even if the defendant pleaded guilty. See, e.g., Dig Laws Ala 412–413, at §§ 1–2 
(Slade 1843).  
230 See, e.g., People v Popescue, 177 NE 739, 744 (Ill 1931); State v Kaufman, 2 NW 275, 276 (Iowa 
1879); People v Noll, 20 Cal 164, 165 (1862).  
231 See, e.g., S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 Mich L Rev 
695, 715 (1927). 
232 See, e.g., State v Reddick, 7 Kan 143, 154–55 (1871) (noting “[a] long train of decisions . . . [that] 
have held such a defect fatal” and holding that a murder verdict that fails to specify the degree “is not 
sufficient to base a judgment upon”); Williams v State, 60 Md 402, 403 (1883) (“A general verdict of 
‘guilty’ on an indictment for murder, is a bad verdict, and on such a verdict no judgement can be 
pronounced.”); Tully v People, 6 Mich 273, 273 (1859) (“[It] is imperative that the jury in their verdict . . . 
shall determine the degree of crime. The judgment must be reversed.”); Robertson v State, 42 Ala 509, 510 
(1868) (“The verdict, in this case, fails to ascertain the degree of murder in which the defendant was guilty, 
and the court erred in passing sentence upon the verdict.”); People v Marquis, 15 Cal 38, 38 (1860) (“[T]he 
jury shall designate in their verdict the degree of the offense. This they have not done, and the Court . . . 
cannot assume that they designed, from a general finding, to fix the grade of the crime. . . . For this error, 
the judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.”); State v Rover, 10 Nev 388, 391 
(1875) (“[A] verdict which fails to designate the degree of murder of which the jury find the defendant 
guilty, is so fatally defective that no judgment or sentence can be legally pronounced thereon.”); State v 
Redman, 17 Iowa 329, 331 (1864) (“[A] verdict in such a case is fatally defective, unless the jury find 
specifically the degree of murder.”); Stears, 2 Mont at 331 (“[T]he verdict in the case of murder must 
express the degree of the crime, or no judgment can be entered thereon.”). See also McGee v State, 8 Mo. 
495, 496 (1844); Hogan, 30 Wis at 435–36; People v Campbell, 40 Cal 129, 138–40 (1870); Kearney v 
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trial **341 judges to fix the degree of crime when the jury verdict failed to do so; to hold 
otherwise would allow judges to overstep limits on their power imposed by the 
constitutional jury guarantees.233 
 
All these jurisdictions insisted that juries should determine the degree of murder, 
not because it was an “element” of a criminal “offense” (it wasn’t), but because they 
thought juries should resolve disputed questions of fact that affect a defendant’s sentence. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, for example, held that juries should decide “every 
grade of crime”234 suggested by the evidence, and based its conclusion on the ground that 
degrees of crime presented “question[s] of fact upon which the jury alone may speak.”235 
It rejected any suggestion that trial courts could decide questions of fact for the jury:  “A 
doctrine more subversive of our law, more alarming in its tendency, and more fatal to that 
bulwark of Anglo-Saxon liberty, the jury system, could not be suggested than that this 
court could settle questions of fact for the jury.”236 Similar views were expressed in other 
state-court decisions.237 These first-degree murder regimes clearly understood the jury’s 
factfinding responsibilities as extending well beyond the “elements” of criminal offenses 
or their “functional equivalents.” 
 
Of course, none of these nineteenth-century legal authorities purported to interpret 
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s jury guarantee. These all involved state court 
decisions and laws enacted before the Sixth Amendment even applied to the states. Yet 
**342 even before incorporation, every state constitution has always guaranteed the right 
of jury trial in criminal cases,238 and in many such provisions the wording is identical to 
the Sixth Amendment.239 And while there was very little case law interpreting the Sixth 
                                                                                                                                                 
People, 17 P 782, 782 (Colo 1888); People v Shafer, 1 Utah 260, 264 (1875); Buster v State, 42 Tex 315, 
319–20 (1874); Allen v State, 26 Ark 333, 333–334 (1870); M’Pherson v State, 17 Tenn 279, 279 (1836); 
Cobia v State, 16 Ala 781, 783 (1849); Hall v State, 12 So 449, 452 (Fla 1893). But see Simpson,  19 SW at 
102 (allowing prisoner to be sentenced for second-degree murder when jury’s verdict failed to specify the 
degree). 
233 See, e.g., State v Montgomery, 11 SW 1012, 1013 (Mo 1889) (“[N]o one else but the jurors can 
perform the duty thus enjoined.”); Kirby, 15 Tenn at 263 (“[T]he court has no power to proceed to 
judgment unless the degree of the crime be ascertained by the verdict of the jury.”); Cobia, 16 Ala at 783 
(“[T]he degree [must] be ascertained by the verdict of the jury, and if this be not done, the court has no 
power to render judgment at all. The judge without the intervention of the jury cannot ascertain the degree 
of guilt.”).  
234 Jones v State, 26 SW 1082, 1086 (Tex Crim 1894).  
235 Id (quoting Halliburton v State, 22 SW 48 (Tex Crim 1893)).  
236 Id (emphasis added). 
237 See, e.g., People v Constantino, 47 NE 37, 41 (NY 1897) (holding that juries must resolve the 
degree of murder because it “was plainly a question of fact.”); Craft v State, 3 Kan 450, 485 (1866) (stating 
that juries must fix the degree of murder as “the exclusive judges of all questions of fact” and “[i]n that 
behalf their power is exclusive and supreme.”); People v Kennedy, 54 NE 51, 53 (NY 1899) (describing 
degrees of homicide as presenting “a question of fact for the jury” while recognizing that “the jury is the 
ultimate tribunal” for resolving “questions of fact arising upon conflicting evidence”); State v Welch, 15 SE 
419, 422 (W Va 1892) (“The question whether the act was murder in the first or second degree was one of 
fact for the jury exclusively.”).  
238 See Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 153 (1968).  
239 See, e.g., SD Const art VI, § 7 (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed.”).  
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Amendment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the unanimous view among the 
states that juries should fix the degree of murder in cases that went to trial, even though 
this fact was not charged in indictments as an “element” of a substantive crime, is at least 
persuasive evidence of what the right of jury trial meant in the early years of our nation’s 
history.240 And it further shows that there is nothing anomalous or unprecedented about 
extending the jury right beyond the facts that prosecutors must charge and prove as 
components of a substantive offense.  
 
VI. 
 
 The problems discussed in the two preceding sections are a direct result of the 
Court’s decision to link the jury right with the reasonable-doubt rule and the concept of 
“elements.” This section will sketch and defend a much broader view of the jury right, 
one that is not tied to the Court’s standard-of-proof requirements, but that is based on the 
traditional understanding of the jury as a separation-of-powers mechanism within the 
judiciary that limits the power of judges over factfinding.  
 
On this view, the jury right should, at a minimum, extend to all disputed questions 
of fact that determine a defendant’s guilt or punishment, regardless of standards of proof. 
This approach would limit the sentencing judge’s powers to resolving questions of law or 
applying law or exercising discretion in accordance with undisputed facts or facts found 
by a jury. Although commentators have shown that this distinction between factual and 
legal ques- **343 tions is not always clear,241 and difficult cases will arise at the margins, 
the Constitution’s text assumes the soundness of this distinction. In defining the civil 
jury’s role, the Seventh Amendment provides that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law,”242 which not only recognizes the distinction between factual and legal 
questions but also reinforces the principle that resolving disputed questions of fact is 
central to a jury’s constitutional task. The Supreme Court continues to use this distinction 
to define the roles of judge and jury in civil litigation,243 and it has shown to be workable, 
even as the Court must occasionally step in to resolve hard cases.244 In the criminal 
context, any distinction between “questions of fact” and “questions of law” will 
necessarily be one of degree. A relatively easy case would involve sentencing categories 
that depend on whether a defendant “visibly possessed a firearm” during his crime, as 
                                                 
240 Cf. generally Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 Stan L Rev 131 
(2006) (relying on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to claim that when a large majority of states make a certain 
decision based on a certain shared belief, and the states are well motivated, there is good reason to believe 
that the decision is correct, provided that certain conditions are met). 
241 See generally, e.g., James Bradley Thayer, “Law and Fact” in Jury Trials, 4 Harv L Rev 147 
(1890); Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 Colum L Rev 1, 11–12 (1922) (“[W]hether a particular 
question is to be treated as a question of law or a question of fact is not in itself a question of fact, but a 
highly artificial question of law.”). 
242 US Const, Amend VII (emphasis added).  
243 See, e.g., Colgrove v Battin, 413 US 149, 157 (1973) (“[T]he purpose of the jury trial in . . . civil 
cases [is] to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues.”); Gasoline Prods. Co. v Champlin Ref. 
Co., 283 US 494, 498 (1931) (“All of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of fact be submitted for 
determination . . . by the jury. . .”). 
244 See generally, e.g., Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 US 370 (1996).  
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this would involve a particularized inquiry into what happened. Still, this might present 
“questions of law” for the court if the parties disagree over the meaning of “visibly 
possessed.” In such situations the judge could instruct the jury on the meaning of those 
words, leaving the jury to apply the court’s interpretation of the law to the facts of the 
case. Or the court might require the jury to return specialized findings limited to factual 
questions about past conduct. Recidivist sentencing enhancements will also involve 
questions of fact for the jury: the existence of prior felony convictions. Although, again, 
questions of law for the court may arise if the parties disagree over the legal definitions of 
“felony” or “misdemeanor.”  
 
Expanding the jury right along these lines would raise important questions for 
quasi-discretionary sentencing regimes that depend on judicial factfinding, such as the 
post-Booker Federal Sentencing **344 Guidelines. After finding the pre-Booker 
Guidelines unconstitutional, the Booker Court held that sentencing courts must calculate 
and consider the Federal Guidelines range, but may impose sentences outside that range 
in light of other concerns.245 Appellate courts must review these sentences for 
“reasonableness.”246 Under this regime, judicial factfinding will influence the ultimate 
sentence imposed, but, unlike the sentencing regimes considered in McMillan, Apprendi, 
Harris, and Blakely, it will not fix concrete minimum and maximum sentences.  
 
The Booker remedy was a product of the Court’s cramped interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment jury right, limited to facts subject to the Court’s reasonable-doubt rule. 
From that perspective, the Court needed only to amend the Guidelines so that no finding 
of fact increased a defendant’s maximum allowable sentence, and the constitutional 
objections melted away. But once one jettisons the Court’s link between the jury right 
and the reasonable-doubt rule and focuses on the jury’s role as a structural constitutional 
guarantee, then the real constitutional problem lies with the Guidelines’ failure to 
maintain a proper division of power between judge and jury. They allow judges to intrude 
on the jury’s factfinding responsibilities by resolving disputed questions of fact that 
determine a defendant’s range of punishment. Booker’s “remedy” does little to allay 
these constitutional concerns. It continues to allow judges to decide factual issues that 
alter a defendant’s range of punishment, but softens the impact of such findings by 
allowing judges to consider other factors in the process.247 Given the importance of the 
jury’s role as factfinder to constitutional structure, one should look askance at any 
scheme that allows judges rather than juries to resolve disputed questions of fact that 
must be considered when deciding what sentence to impose, especially in light of 
empirical evidence suggesting that “voluntary guidelines” affect judges’ sentencing 
practices like mandatory guidelines.248 The need, recognized by Blackstone, to protect the 
                                                 
245 See 543 US at 245–246, 261. 
246 Id at 261.  
247 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 Denver L Rev 665, 677–678 (2006) (noting 
that the Booker remedy does little to address the Sixth Amendment concerns under the pre-Booker 
Guidelines system).  
248 See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The 
Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines 48, online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=869977 (noting that judges 
often comply with “voluntary guidelines” because “(1) they provide useful information, (2) legislatures can 
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jury **345 guarantee “from all secret machinations which may sap and undermine it,”249 
should lead the Court to extend the jury right to disputed questions of fact even under 
advisory sentencing guidelines. This would also include factual findings in capital 
sentencing regimes that rely on “guided discretion.”  
 
Finally, one must consider the constitutionality of fully discretionary sentencing 
regimes. Discretionary sentencing has a long pedigree; both at common law and 
throughout our nation’s history, judges have been given discretion to choose levels of 
fines, whipping, or imprisonment up to a prescribed statutory maximum.250 And the 
Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment imposes no barrier to fully 
discretionary sentencing, even though a judge might exercise his discretion in accordance 
with his own perception of the facts, without asking a jury to resolve any disputed factual 
issues that he might deem relevant.251 On the other hand, a so-called “hanging judge” 
might systematically impose tough sentences without considering or resolving factual 
questions in the process. These discretionary regimes allow judges to base a defendant’s 
sentence on factual determinations that were not submitted to a jury, but do not require 
them to do so. Still, the idea that an individual judge can act as a sentencing commission 
unto himself is troubling if the jury right is meant to limit judicial power over factfinding.  
 
There are two possible approaches in considering the Sixth Amendment’s 
implications for discretionary sentencing. One is to require sentencing judges to ask 
juries for special findings whenever there are genuine disputes between the parties as to 
issues of fact that the judge might deem relevant to his ultimate sentencing decision. This 
would be similar to a capital sentencing regime that gives the judge discretion whether to 
sentence a defendant to life imprisonment or death, but requires the jury to resolve 
relevant factual disputes and provide a non-binding sentencing recommen- **346 dation 
to the judge.252 Of course, such a rule will be difficult for appellate courts to enforce, as 
discretionary sentencing regimes allow trial judges to conceal their true motives and 
reasons for imposing a particular sentence. This may explain why even the most pro-
Apprendi Justices have never been willing to impose such limitations on purely 
discretionary sentencing regimes, content to leave the jury right as an “underenforced 
constitutional norm” in this context. But declaring a rule that requires sentencing judges 
to submit factual disputes to juries would help preserve the jury’s structural role without 
taking the more radical step of imposing a constitutional ban on discretionary sentencing 
regimes.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
threaten to replace them with more-mandatory systems, and (3) judges can be held accountable for 
noncompliance (outside of appellate reversal)”). 
249 Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *343 (cited in note 22).  
250 See, e.g., An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States §§ 23, 26, 1 Stat 
112, 117, 118 (1790) (setting forth penalties of imprisonment “not exceeding” a certain number of years, 
and authorizing fines “at the discretion of the court”); John Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 
584 (Butterworths, 3d ed 1990). 
251 See, e.g., Booker, 543 US at 233 (“[W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific 
sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the 
judge deems relevant.”). 
252 See, e.g., 11 Del Code Ann § 4209 (2006).  
Apprendi’s Domain  2006 Supreme Court Review 297 
 
  
 38 
 
Another possibility is to draw a constitutional distinction between the binary 
factfinding required by sentencing guidelines and the probabilistic weighing of evidence 
allowed by a fully discretionary sentencing regime.253 Sentencing guidelines require the 
sentencer to treat a fact as established, or not, depending on whether a burden of proof is 
met. Fully discretionary sentencing imposes no such requirement. It allows the 
decisionmaker to adjust sentences based on mere probabilities and to calibrate the effect 
on a sentence in light of such probabilities. A sentencer might take into account a 10 
percent likelihood that a defendant carried a gun during the crime, along with an 80 
percent likelihood that his difficult upbringing affected his moral culpability. In doing 
this, a judge isn’t forced to resolve questions of fact in a binary way; he’s allowed to 
weigh different probabilities and use those to adjust his sentence. This at least provides a 
possible means by which to distinguish the “sentencing factors” that must be found by 
juries from the fully discretionary sentencing regimes that have always been thought 
constitutional.   
 
In all events, defining the jury right in accordance with “questions of fact” would 
truly give “intelligible content” to that right by closing the door on most attempts to avoid 
the jury through legislative draftsmanship. And this approach has a substantial pedigree 
in historical sources and early state-court decisions that emphasize the jury’s structural 
role in preventing judges from resolving factual questions. The Supreme Court, however, 
cannot extend the jury right in this manner unless it stops linking the **347 jury right 
with the reasonable-doubt rule. Under the current case law, any expansion of “jury facts” 
leads to a concomitant expansion in facts subject to the reasonable-doubt standard, and 
the Justices will not (and should not) hold that all facts legally relevant to guilt or 
punishment must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.254 Such a holding would overrule 
Patterson v New York and prohibit states from requiring criminal defendants to bear the 
burden of proof on affirmative defenses such as self-defense or insanity. Even Justice 
Thomas, who has embraced the most expansive theory of “elements,” was unwilling to 
go that far.255 But if the Court severs its link between these constitutional protections, it 
could extend the jury right to all defenses and sentencing facts, without requiring 
prosecutors to charge and prove such facts beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
 At the same time, the Supreme Court should limit the reasonable-doubt rule and 
the concept of “elements” to something akin to their pre-Apprendi scope. This would 
include facts labeled as “elements” in criminal codes, along with facts that the Supreme 
Court might deem a “tail which wags the dog of a substantive offense,”256 but not every 
sentencing fact that increases the ceiling on a defendant’s punishment. The historical 
evidence described in Section V is merely the latest in a long string of criticisms leveled 
at court decisions that require prosecutors to charge and prove sentencing enhancements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, as if they were “elements” of a substantive crime. Professor 
Stephanos Bibas, for example, has criticized Apprendi for increasing prosecutorial power, 
                                                 
253 I thank Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz for suggesting this concept of “probabilistic factfinding.”  
254 See Section II.B.   
255 See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 US at 501 (Thomas, J, concurring); Harris, 536 US at 575 (Thomas, J, 
dissenting).  
256 McMillan, 477 US at 88. 
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giving them more “crimes” to charge and strengthening their hand in plea-bargaining 
negotiations.257 Justice Breyer has argued that Apprendi could harm criminal defendants 
by forcing them to contest prejudicial sentencing facts during the guilt phase of trial 
rather than a bifurcated sentencing proceeding,258 and he has further complained that 
Apprendi will lead to cruder **348 punishments by requiring sentences to be based on 
facts charged by prosecutors rather than real-offense conduct.259 
 
 But these problems arise only because some courts regard Apprendi’s “jury facts” 
as components of substantive crimes that prosecutors must charge and prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If Apprendi had simply required juries to decide all disputed questions 
of fact at sentencing, without any expansion of the reasonable-doubt rule and the concept 
of “elements,” it could have protected the jury’s factfinding role without relying on false 
historical claims regarding the meaning of “elements,” and without giving rise to the 
pragmatic concerns noted by Professor Bibas and Justice Breyer. Indeed, the nineteenth-
century first-degree murder cases demonstrate that jurisdictions can require juries to 
determine sentencing factors without adding new charging weapons to the prosecutor’s 
arsenal, and that jury factfinding can co-exist with “real-offense” sentencing and 
bifurcated sentencing proceedings.260 None of the concerns noted by Professor Bibas and 
Justice Breyer should undermine Apprendi’s Sixth Amendment holding, once we jettison 
the Court’s link between the jury right and the “elements” of crimes subject to the 
Court’s reasonable-doubt rule. 
 
 
 
   Factfinder: 
Standard of Proof: Right to Jury Determination No Right to Jury 
Proof Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt 
Required 
Elements 
 
Less than Proof 
Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt Allowed 
Affirmative Defenses 
All Sentencing Factors 
 
 
Fig. 2 
 
Figure 2 illustrates this alternative approach, which expands the jury right to all 
questions of fact, but limits the reasonable-doubt rule to its pre-Apprendi scope. 
Compare the above proposal to the Court’s current approach, shown in figure 3. 
                                                 
257 Bibas, 110 Yale L J at 1168–1170 (cited in note 224); see also Blakely, 542 US at 331 (Breyer, J, 
dissenting). 
258 See, e.g., Blakely, 542 US at 335 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (“How can a Constitution that guarantees 
due process put these defendants, as a matter of course, in the position of arguing, ‘I did not sell drugs, and 
if I did, I did not sell more than 500 grams’ . . . ?”)  
259 See Apprendi, 530 US at 555–556 (Breyer, J, dissenting). 
260 See Section V.B. 
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   Factfinder: 
Standard of Proof: Right to Jury Determination No Right to Jury 
Proof Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt 
Required 
Elements 
“Apprendi facts” (or “Functional 
Equivalents” of Elements) 
 
Less than Proof 
Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt Allowed 
 All Other Sentencing 
Factors 
 
 Fig. 3 
 
 One challenge for this proposed approach is the prospect that **349 legislatures 
might evade the reasonable-doubt rule (and the Fifth Amendment’s Indictment clause) by 
relabeling “elements” of crimes as “sentencing factors.” Of course, this same problem is 
already present in the current Apprendi regime, which allows legislatures to avoid the 
reasonable-doubt rule by establishing “mitigating” sentencing factors or “affirmative 
defenses,” or facts that establish mandatory minimum punishments. And one might think 
that Winship’s proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement is best left as a default rule, 
given the historical and practical barriers to a more expansive regime.261 But for those 
who are not content to leave Winship as a mere default rule, this possibility of legislative 
evasion must be taken seriously.  
 
Fortunately, rejecting Apprendi’s reasonable-doubt holding will not necessarily 
leave the concept of “elements” completely at the mercy of the political branches. Even 
before Apprendi, the Supreme Court indicated that it would look past statutory labels if it 
deemed a fact to be a “tail which wags the dog of a substantive offense.”262 While the 
Blakely Court ridiculed this standard as hopelessly subjective,263 nothing prevents the 
Court from adopting a more determinative constitutional standard for “elements” that 
stops short of Apprendi’s historically indefensible view that includes every sentencing 
fact that increases the ceiling on a defendant’s **350 punishment.264 Exploring all the 
possibilities in this regard would require another article, but one should not conclude that 
the doctrinal benefits from avoiding Apprendi’s expansive concept of “elements” will 
come at the cost of eviscerating proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a constitutional 
requirement. 
 
VII. 
 
Although the Supreme Court uses the concept of “elements” to define boundaries 
for the reasonable-doubt rule, that should not define the scope of a criminal defendant’s 
                                                 
261 See Section II.B.  
262 See McMillan, 477 US at 88. 
263 See Blakely, 542 US at 302 n 6, 307–08.  
264 Cf. Patterson, 432 US at 216–32 (Powell, J, dissenting).  
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right of jury trial. The Supreme Court went off track in McMillan v Pennsylvania,265 
when it collapsed the jury trial and standard-of-proof claims into a unitary inquiry, 
holding that the jury right extends only to “elements” of criminal offenses subject to the 
Court’s reasonable-doubt rule. This has infected the Court’s Apprendi jurisprudence, 
which proceeds as if the right of jury trial and the reasonable-doubt rule are co-extensive. 
 
Because the Supreme Court has linked the jury right with the proof-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard, it is unable to extend the jury right in a manner that 
meaningfully protects the jury’s constitutional factfinding role, because it could not 
countenance a corresponding expansion in the reasonable-doubt rule and the concept of 
“elements.” At the same time, when the Court has extended the jury right to certain 
sentencing enhancements, the accompanying expansion in the reasonable-doubt rule has 
produced a revisionist concept of “elements” that cannot be justified on historical or 
pragmatic grounds. In sum, the Apprendi jurisprudence has given us the worst of both 
worlds: a circumscribed jury role that is easily evaded, and an overbroad theory of 
“elements” that lacks historical support, gives new powers to prosecutors that were not 
conferred by legislatures, and brings needless pragmatic and doctrinal complications to 
court decisions that broaden the right of jury trial. All of this stems from the Court’s 
assumption that the jury right goes hand-in-hand with the reasonable-doubt rule and the 
concept of “elements,” a premise that originalists and pragmatists alike should reject.   
 
 The Court should therefore sever its link between the jury right **351 and the 
reasonable-doubt rule, expanding the former while constricting the latter. Juries should 
resolve any disputed question of fact that purports to aggravate or mitigate a defendant’s 
range of punishment. But sentencing factors should not be regarded as “functional 
equivalents of elements” that prosecutors must charge and prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt whenever they increase a defendant’s maximum allowable punishment. This 
approach would protect the jury’s constitutional factfinding prerogatives while avoiding 
the historical and doctrinal problems arising from an overbroad understanding of 
“elements.” And such a framework should satisfy most of Apprendi’s defenders and 
critics. Apprendi’s supporters should approve a regime that actually provides “intelligible 
content” for the jury right, unlike the Court’s current jurisprudence. And once “jury 
facts” are decoupled from the “elements” of crimes that must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and charged in indictments in federal prosecutions, court decisions that 
expand the jury right will no longer increase prosecutorial power, limit the use of “real-
offense” sentencing, or force prejudicial sentencing facts into the guilt phase of trial.  
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